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NOTES 
Regulation of Electroconvulsive Therapy 
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) 1 is a psychiatric procedure that 
induces a convulsive seizure in the patient in order to treat severe 
depression. 2 Recently, courts, 3 legislatures, 4 and the medical pro-
fession 5 have paid increasing attention to the regulation of ECT. 
Their interest has been stimulated by the growing recognition of the 
rights of mental patients, 6 the developing role of consent in medical 
I. For an extensive analysis of legislative involvement in this area, see Note, 
Legislative Control of Shock Treatment, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 738 (1975). Electroconvul-
sive therapy has in the past commonly been referred to as "shock treatment." While 
insulin coma therapy and other convulsion-inducing therapies may still be occasionally 
used by a few practitioners, by far the most widespread form is electroconvulsive 
therapy. The term "convulsive" rather than "shock" therapy is preferred by the 
medical profession because the convulsion itself is the common element in these 
treatments and because "shock treatment" has negative connotations. Such connota-
tions are regarded as unfortunate by advocates of treatment, see, e.g., L. CAMMER, UP 
FROM DEPRESSION 153 (1969) ("a disquieting misnomer for an excellent and highly 
beneficial treatment method"), but opponents have deliberately emphasized them to 
discredit treatment, see, e.g., Adams, You're in for the Shock of Your Life, MADNESS 
NETWORK NEWS READER 84 (Frank ed. 1974) (pointing to one practitioner who 
favors term "electric/shock torture"). 
2. See Electroconvulsive Therapy in Massachusetts: A Task Force Report, 3 
MASS. J. MENTAL HEALTH 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT]; 
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF H.E.W., NATL. CLEARINGHOUSE FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION, FACTS .ABOUT ELECTRO SHOCK THERAPY 74-88 (1972) [hereinafter cited 
as CLEARINGHOUSE PAMPHLET]; note 24 infra. 
3. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), supplemental 
decision, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 
af fd. in part, remanded in part and revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., 
Feb. 28, 1975); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1206 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Aden 
v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976); Price v. Sheppard, -
Minn.-, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976). 
4. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 23 (Supp. 1974) (patient has right to 
refuse shock treatment and lobotomy); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1716 (1974) 
(consent required for surgery and electroshock therapy); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE 
LAW§ 15.03(b)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (consent required for surgery and shock 
treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122.55.6 (1974) (informed consent required for 
nonemergency surgery and electroshock treatment); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 426.700 to 
426.755 (1975) (informed consent required for psychosurgery and intracranial brain 
stimulation); WASH. REV. CoDE § 71.05.370(7) (1974) (patient has right to refuse 
lobotomy, nonemergency surgery, and electroshock treatment); California Chapter 
1109, Calif. Leg. Service, 1975-76, No. 9, at 4680 (signed by Gov. Brown Sept. 20, 
1976). 
5. Psychiatrists are now actively involved in ECT research, see note 8 infra, 
regulation of ECT through professional organizations, see California Area Branches 
Draft ECT Guidelines, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Feb. 6, 1976, at 1, 22-23, and debate over 
the merits of the treatment, see 1 CoNVULSIVE THERAPY BULL. (1976). 
6. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See generally Advances in 
Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 
(1975). 
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transactions, 7 and the results of recent scientific research on the 
efficacy and consequences of ECT. 8 
Regulation of ECT has generally focused on whether the patient 
or his representative0 effectively consented to the treatment. The 
highly intrusive nature of ECT10 and the unique circumstances of 
those patients who are likely to receive it11 create particularly diffi-
cult legal issues concerning the validity of the patient's consent. 
This Note will examine the various methods that are available to 
protect the rights of patients for whom ECT is proposed. After 
briefly explaining the nature of the therapy, the Note will discuss 
the efficacy of judicial remedies with respect to both competent and 
incompetent patients. It will argue that, because of the peculiar 
nature of ECT, special procedures that ensure the existence of con-
sent to state-administered ECT may be constitutionally required. It 
will then address specific procedures legislatively enacted by several 
states for the regulation of ECT12 and will assess their constitutional 
limitations, 13 with emphasis upon the problem that a regulatory 
scheme, in its effort to protect patients from unconsented therapy, 
7. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treat-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 340-48 (1974); Schneyer, Informed Consent and tlte 
Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. RBV, 
124, 148-55. 
8. New studies focusing on the problems of memory loss include: May, Tuma, 
Yale, Potepan & Dixon, Schizophrenia-A Follow-up Study of Results of Treatment, 
33 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH. 481 (1976); Squire & Chace, Memory Functions Six to 
Nine Months After Electroconvulsive Therapy, 32 ARcmv.es GEN, PSYCH. 1557 
(1975). 
9. Note that in cases of total incompetency, a guardian, state-approved review 
panel, or other representative may be allowed to consent for the patient. This 
substituted consent is discussed in text at note 143 infra. When the term "patient" is 
used in this Note, it includes those persons or bodies qualified to give substituted 
consent. 
10. See text at notes 81-82 infra. 
11. See text at notes 109-30 infra. 
12. See note 4 supra. 
13. It should be pointed out that, while this Note focuses particularly on ECT, the 
interest of mental patients in being free from unwanted psychiatric treatment extends 
to other forms of therapy as well. An analysis of ECT regulation may serve as a 
model for regulation of other psychiatric treatments. For example, increasing 
attention is being given to the use and effects of psychotropic medications. See 
Marker, Phenothiazines and the Mentally Retarded: Institutional Drug-Abuse?, in 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW PRo.1.ecr, SUMMARY OF AcnvmES 1 (March 1975). The 
value of ECT as a model treatment is more apparent when one compares public 
reactions to "shock" and "chemo" therapy. Our culture is so accustomed to the 
frequency, ease, and acceptability of taking drugs that the misuse of drugs may seem a 
less serious area for mental health regulation. Yet by different physiological mecha-
nisms, ECT and psychotropic drugs appear to present similar potential harms to 
patients. See Bornstein, The Forcible Administration of Drugs to Prisoners and 
Mental Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379 (1975); Note, Mental Health-The 
Right to Refuse Drug Therapy Under Emergency Restraint Statutes, 11 NEW ENO, 
L. REV. 509 (1976). 
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may interfere with the right of patients to consent to privately ad-
ministered ECT. 
I. THE ADMINISTRATION, PURPOSES, AND 
EFFECTS OF ECT 
ECT is the term generally used to describe several types of 
psychiatric treatment,14 all of which involve inducing in the patient 
a convulsive seizure similar to a grand mal epileptic attack.15 The 
patient does not eat for four hours prior to the convulsion. Sedatives 
may be provided. before treatment, but usually no drug therapy 
occurs. One-half hour before the convulsion, atropine, ~ preanes-
thetic medication that reduces the risk of suffocation by decreasing 
the production of saliva, is fumished.16 A fast-acting barbiturate 
anesthetic is then injected so that the patient will feel neither the 
muscle contractions that precede muscle relaxation nor the 
unpleasant sensation of respiratory arrest.17 Electrodes are at-
tached18 to the patient's temples19 and a current that ranges between 
seventy and 130 volts is administered for 0.1 to 0.5 seconds.20 The 
14. These are pharmacological shock or convulsive therapy, insulin coma treat-
ment, and electroconvulsive therapy. See Krouner, Shock Therapy and Psychiatric 
Malpractice: The Legal Accommodation to a Controversial Treatment, 2 FOR. Sci. 
397,423 nn.11 & 12 (1973). See also L. KALINOWSKY & H. HIPPIUS, PHARMACOLOGI-
CAL CONVULSIVE AND OTHER SOMATIC TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY 269 n.3 (1-969). 
15. For general descriptions of ECT treatment, see Kalinowsky, The Convulsive 
Therapies in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1279-85 (A. Freedmand & H. 
Kaplan eds. 1967). 
16. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402. 
17. See id. 
18. To increase conductivity and prevent burns, graphite jelly is applied to the 
temples. See Kalinowsky, supra note 15, at 1279. 
19. In unilateral ECT, electric current is applied by placement of one electrode to 
the nondominant hemisphere of the brain. Bilateral ECT employs two electrodes, 
one on each temple. The distinction is significant. Unilateral treatment results in a 
lessening of posttreatment memory loss and confusion. See Karliner, Present Status 
of Unilateral Shock Treatments, 4 BEHAVIORAL NEUROPSYCH. 2-4, 12 (1973); Abrams, 
Recent Clinical Studies of ECT, 4 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 3-5 (1972); Dornbush, 
Memory and Induced ECT Convulsions, 4 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 47-49 (1972). 
However, a greater number of unilateral treatments than bilateral is necessary to 
achieve therapeutic benefit. See CLEARINGHOUSE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 9. For 
example, unilateral treatments may be given daily but bilateral is rarely administered 
more than three times a week. See MASS. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 4. Unilateral 
ECT may involve a trade-off of reduced memory impairment for the other risks 
implicit in a greater number of treatments. One psychiatrist reports preference for 
bilateral placement despite its lessened clinical effectiveness because the patient is 
spared the additional anesthetic risks of the more frequent unilateral treatments. See 
Gabriel, ECT as the Treatment of Choice, WORLD MED. NEWS RE.v., Nov. 1974, at 
68. Electrode placement may thus determine the degree or nature of posttreatment 
impairment. This may make especially significant the physician's disclosure of 
dangers to the patient and the patient's participation in choosing which risks he may 
prefer to accept. 
20. F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE TliEoRY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 337 
(1966). 
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seizure, the therapeutic agent, lasts between thirty and fifty 
seconds. 21 The patient remains totally unconscious for a few 
minutes after the convulsion; full consciousness is regained in five 
to thirty minutes. 22 
This procedure is most widely used to treat severe depression:i:1 
and schizophrenia. 2~ Although there is evidence, 25 albeit dis-
puted, 26 that it has at least some positive effect, there is little agree-
ment as to the process by which ECT ameliorates these conditions. 27 
One theory posits that ECT works by producing a regression of be-
havior to infantile levels, which enables the patient's personality to 
be restructured.28 Other explanations are that it causes amnesia 
which helps repress stressful and unpleasant experiences, 20 that it 
induces fear in the patient, 30 that it makes the patient feel he is 
being punished, thereby assuaging his conscience,31 or that it stimu-
lates certain chemicals in the brain.32 None of these theories, how-
21. The seizure or convulsion consists of the body shaking and twitching and of a 
transient apnea or loss of breath. D. McCARTHY & K. BoRRIN, MEDICAL TREATMENT 
OF MENTAL DISEASE: THE TOXIC AND ORGANIC BASIS OF PSYCHIATRY 593-96 (1955), 
When muscle relaxants are used, however, the violent shaking of the body is not 
experienced by the patient; the only observable motion during convulsion may be a 
twitching of the toes. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 
639 (1971). 
22. D. McCARTHY & K. BoRRIN, supra note 21, at 594. 
23. The medical illness for which ECT is most widely recognized as appropriate 
is involutional melancholia, the depressed phase of manic-depressive illness, some-
times called psychotic depressive reaction. See E. ROSEN, R. Fox & I. GREGORY, 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 433 (2d ed. 1972). As emphasized by the Massachusetts 
Task Force Report, "the use of the term 'depressed' by the patient should not 
immediately be construed to imply the presence of an affective disorder. Descriptive 
phrases such as 'non-functional' or 'depressed person' are insufficient to justify the use 
of ECT." MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. 
24. Sullivan, Treatment of Acute Schizophrenia: The Place of ECT, 35 DISEASES 
OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 467-69 (1974). Although agreement exists that ECT is 
effective in treating wildly destructive or catatonic patients by controlling behavior so 
that other treatments (psychotropic drugs and psychotherapy) can be used, there is 
no consensus on any other role for ECT in ·the treatment of schizophrenia. See 
MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. 
25. See L. CAMMER, supra note 1, at 153; MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 
2, at 19. 
26. See, e.g., Friedberg, Electroshock Therapy: Let's Stop Blasti11g the Brai11, 
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug., 1975, at 18. 
27. See Miller, Psychological Theories of E.C.T.: A Review, 113 BRIT. J. PSYCH., 
301, 301-11 (1967). 
28. Cameron, Lohrenz & Handcock, The Depattemi11g Treatment of Schizophre-
nia, 3 CoMPREHENSIVE PSYCH. 65 (1.962); Murillo & Exner, The Effects of Regressivl! 
ECT with Process Schizophrenics, 130 AM. J. PSYCH., 269, 269-73 (1973 ). 
29. See Miller, supra note 27, at 303. 
30. See id. at 304-05. 
31. See L. KALINOWSKY & H. HIPPIUS, supra note 14, at 375. 
32. See Abrams & Taylor, Electroconvulsive Therapy and the Diencephalon: A 
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ever, has been widely accepted.33 This inability to discern the 
manner in which ECT works34 makes it difficult for physicians to 
predict accurately which patients will benefit from the treatment. 35 
A major problem with ECT therapy is that physical complications 
can result from the convulsion. Bone fractures and dislocations 
have been a frequent consequence of the violent seizure. 36 
Although muscle relaxants are now often administered before the 
convulsion to reduce the risk of fractures,37 it is still accepted medi-
cal practice to administer ECT without them. 38 Respiratory and 
cardiovascular complications have also occurred.39 However, care-
ful pretreatment investigation for physicial weaknesses, 40 and the 
Preliminary Report, 15 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCH. 233, 233-36 (1974); Fink, The 
Therapeutic Process in ECT, 4 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 39, 42-44 (1972); Hamadah, 
Holmes, Barker, Hartman & Parke, Effects of Electric Convulsive Therapy on 
Urinary Excretion of 3', 5' Cyclic Adenosine Monophosphate, 1972 BRIT. MED. J. 
439, 439-41 (1972). 
33. Ketty, Biochemical and Neurochemical Effects of Electroconvulsive Shock, in 
PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CoNVULSIVE THERAPY 285, 292 (M. Fink, s. Ketty, J. McGaugh & 
T. Williams eds. 1974). 
34. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 21, at 641-42. 
35. Id. at 645. But see Mendels, The Prediction of Response to Electroconvulsive 
Therapy, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 153 (1967). 
36. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402-03. 
37. See id. at 403. 
38. See Pettis v. State Dept. of Hosps., - La. App. -, -, 336 So. 2d 521, 528 
(1976); Foxlger v. State, 23 Misc. 2d 933, 934, 203 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. 
1960). In these cases the plaintiffs suffered fractures following the administration of 
unmodified ECT. No negligence was found on the part of the treating physicians 
because the absence of muscle relaxants was an accepted medical technique of ECT 
administration. Practitioners who give ECT without muscle relaxants argue that 
their use entails too many independent risks. 
39. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402. Other negative consequences include 
amenorrhea, see Michael, The Menstrual Cycle and Recovery During Shock Treat-
ment, 15 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 342 (1954), permanent epileptic 
disorders, see Assael, Centrencephalic Epilepsy Induced by Electro Convulsive Treat-
ment, 23 ELECTROENCEPHALIC CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 193 (1967), aggravation 
of preexisting lung disease, see Krouner, supra note 14, at 402-03 n.129, and sexual 
disturbances, see Weinstein, Sexual Disturbances After Brain Injury, 8 MEDICAL 
ASPECTS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 10 (1974). 
40. Osteoporosis, old age liver disease, recent cerebral hemorrhage, severe debili-
tating illness, and recent heart or lung disease have been cited as physical weaknesses 
that make ECT administration particularly dangerous. See MASS. TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 1 h One study, however, has indicated that ECT can be safely 
administered to patients with a history of heart trouble. See Ballenger, Electrocon-
vulsive Therapy and Cardiac Pacemakers, 14 PSYCHOSOMATICS 233-34 (1973). Pre-
treatment screening should also include considerations of the interaction between 
other medications the patient may have taken and drugs administered as part of the 
ECT procedure. See Chessen, Geha & Salzman, ECT, Glaucoma, and Prolonged 
Apnea, 35 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 152 (1974). See also Unrecognized 
Adult Phenylketonuria, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 395, 397 (1973) (two women 
inappropriately given ECT when ferric chloride test would have revealed an undiscov-
ered metabolic disorder). 
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use of muscle relaxants, barbiturate anesthetics, and oxygen have 
greatly reduced these complications. 41 
Of far greater concern are the mental complications of ECT-par-
ticularly disorientation and loss of memory. Disorientation may be 
so complete that the patient will not remember the names of people 
around him and, in rare cases, his occupation. 42 Such confusion has 
been reported to persist for as long as six months after treatment. 43 
This effect may actually be a necessary part of the therapy, for some 
clinicians believe that -the extent of the treatment's eventual success 
is directly proportional to the amount of temporary disorientation. 44 
That loss of memory is also a frequent result of ECT is not seriously 
questioned. However, the scope and length of the loss is a subject 
of vigorous debate within the psychiatric profession. 46 Total am-
nesia typically occurs throughout the entire course of a series of 
treatments. 46 Some authorities state that memory usually returns 
within a few weeks of the final treatment;47 however, there are also 
41. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402. 
42. T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 21, at 641-42. Kalinowsky suggests that, 
because of the problem presented by the patient's increasing confusion during the 
course of treatment, physicians should "warn the relatives most carefully to keep the 
patient away not only from friends (who, seeing him in this confused state, might 
draw wrong conclusions as to his mental capacities) but from his business, where he 
might do much harm without realizing it." L. KALINOWSKY & H. HIPPIUS, supra note 
14, at 184. 
43. Ulett, Smith & Gieser, Evaluation of Convulsive and Subconvulsive Shock 
Therapies Utilizing a Control Group, 112 AM. J. PSYCH. 795 (1956). 
44. Robitscher, A Duty to Desist in Informed Consent: When Can It Be 
Withdrawn?, 2 HASTINGS REPORT 10, 11 (1972). 
45. Zamora & Kaelbling, Memory and Electroconvulsive Therapy, 12 AM. J. 
PSYCH. 546 (1965). The accounts of psychiatrists and patients concerning memory 
loss differ. For example, Kalinowsky states: "Neurotics with hypochondrical tend-
encies complain more often than other patients of not remembering names and places, 
of difficulty in concentrating or of forgetting more easily. All patients who remain 
unimproved after ECT are inclined to complain bitterly of their memory difficulties." 
L. KALINOWSKY & P. HOCH, SHOCK TREATMENTS, PSYCHOSURGERY AND OTHER SO-
MATIC 'TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY 139 (1952). See L. CAMMER, supra note 1, at 
157. 
Yet descriptions by patients suggest that memory loss is real. As one patient has 
stated: "I'd lost the body of knowledge that constituted my professional skill •... 
I'd lost my experience, my knowing. But it was worse than that. I felt that I'd lost 
myself." Roueche, Annals of Medicine: As Empty as Eve, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 
9, 1974, at 96. Ernest Hemingway is reported to have commented after receiving a 
series of ECT treatments at the Mayo Clinic: "Well, what is the sense of ruining my 
head and erasing my memory, which is my capital, and putting me out of business? It 
was a brilliant cure but we lose the patient •••• " A. HOTCHNER, PAPA HEMINGWAY: 
A PERSONAL MEMOIR 308 (1966). 
Whether memory loss can be traced to physiological or psychological causes 
may have greater scientific than legal significance. In any case, physicians should be 
required to warn the patient of the risk of amnesia as part of obtaining informed con-
sent. See text at note 118 infra. 
46. Kalinowsky, The Convulsive Therapies, in TREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 349-50 
(A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1972). 
47. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 19, at 642-43. 
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reports of permanent memory impairment. 48 Memory loss may ex-
tend to events occuring before49 or after50 the treatment. Although 
other serious mental complications of ECT are not thoroughly docu-
mented, there is some evidence indicating that ECT may cause brain 
damage51 and impairment of learning ability.112 
II. JUDICIAL REGULATION OF 
ELECTROCONVULSIVE 'THERAPY 
Although some states have comprehensive legislation that controls 
48. See Roueche, supra note 45, at 84; Goldman, Gomer & Templer, Long Term 
Effects of Electroconvulsive Therapy Upon Memory and Perceptual-Motor Per-
formance, 28 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 33. Studies indicate that the placement of 
electrodes can significantly affect the duration and type of memory loss that occurs. 
See d'Elia, Memory Studies in Electroconvulsive Therapy with Different Electrode 
Placements, 37 BRAIN RESEARCH 364 (1972); note 19 supra. 
49. This is called retrograde amnesia. See Squires, Slater & Chace, Retrograde 
Amnesia: Temporal Gradient in Very Long Term Memory Following Electroconvul-
sive Therapy, 187 SclENCE 77-79 (1975). 
50. This is called anterograde amnesia. Dombush & Williams, Memory and 
ECT, in PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CoNVULSIVE THERAPY 199, 201 (M. Fink, s. Ketty, J. 
McGaugh & T. Williams eds. 1974). Anterograde amnesia may be classified not as 
memory loss but as an impairment of the ability to learn. See note 76 infra. 
51. The relation between ECT and brain damage is uncertain. The Massachu-
setts Task Force on Electroconvulsive Therapy reported: 
Despite the assertions of some authors that ECT may produce a subtle form of 
brain damage, and that they have seen several patients with histories of excellent 
educational achievements demonstrate subnormal intelligence quotients after 
multiple courses of ECT, most authors do not believe that permanent brain dam-
age occurs when a reasonable number of treatments are properly administered 
with sufficient oxygen. It is apparent, however, that a definitive answer is not 
available regarding the likelihood of permanent brain damage resulting from an 
unusually large number of treatments. 
MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. One study nonetheless suggests that, 
because ECT may have a local effect on the brain structure immediately under the 
electrodes, electrodes should be placed over cortical areas not directly related to 
crucial mental functions and that placement should be individualized depending on 
the patient's occupation: "For example for a carpenter who must earn his living by 
skeletomuscular activities, i.e., nonverbal activities, unilateral electrode placement 
over the dominant hemisphere may be optimal, even though that particular placement 
carries a greater risk of loss of verbal memory function." McGaugh & Williams, 
Neurophysiological and Behavioral Effects of Convulsive Phenomena, in THE PSY-
CHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY 279, 282 (M. Fink, S. Ketty, J. McGaugh & T. 
Williams eds. 1974). Serious questions are raised by the repeated admonitions in 
psychiatric literature concerning the relationship between electrode placement and 
patient occupation. Just as manual capabilities of a carpenter should be preserved, 
"one should also be cautious with the man who uses a highly trained memory in the 
exercise of his profession." w. SARGANT & E. SLATER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PHYSICAL METHODS OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY 73 (1972); Memory Disturbances 
After ECT-A Major or Minor Side Effect?, 134 INTERNATIONAL CoNGRESS Ser. 161 
(1967) (Academy of Psychosomatic Medicine). 
52. Some interference with the ability to store information received by the patient 
after treatment has been reported. See Squire & Miller, Diminution of Anterograde 
Amnesia Following Electroco11vulsive Therapy, 125 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 490, 490-95 
(1974). Again, the placement of the electrodes seems related to the nature of the 
learning impairment which can follow treatment. Berent, Cohen & Silverman, 
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the administration of ECT,53 most patients must still rely on the 
courts for protection. Because ECT is a form of medical treatment 
that involves a physical invasion of the patient's body, traditional tort 
doctrines, which are adequately discussed elsewhere, 64 apply: If the 
patient does not consent to the treatment, or if he is not fully advised 
of its risks, an action for damages is available. It is being in-
creasingly recognized, however, that a patient who receives ECT 
without his consent is not limited to remedies in tort; such medical 
practices may violate the patient's constitutional rights as well. 
With the exception of those cases where ECT is administered in 
private settings on an inpatient or outpatient basis, the state is usually 
sufficiently involved with the administration of ECT to satisfy the 
Constitution's state action requirement. 55 This section of the Note 
contends that the administration of ECT by the state to a noncon-
senting patient56 violates several of his constitutional rights. G7 In 
order to give such treatment, the state therefore must show either 
that the patient has effectively consented to the medical care, there-
by waiving his right to the constitutional protections violated by the 
forcible medical intervention, or that it possesses a sufficiently strong 
Changes in Verbal and Nonverbal Learnings Following a Single Left or Right 
Unilateral Electroconvulsive Treatment, 10 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 95, 95-100 (1975). 
53. See statutes cited note 4 supra. 
54. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 101-05 (4th ed. 1971). 
55. It is recognized that the state action requirement limits the class of protected 
patients. Three levels of state involvement can be discerned by categorizing patients 
according to admission status and place of treatment. Arguably in the case of 
involuntarily committed patients, whether to a public or private hospital, the state has 
been sufficiently active in bringing about the individual's status as a patient to meet 
the fourteenth amendment standard. The next level would be patients voluntarily hos-
pitalized in state institutions. The state's involvement is not in securing the hospitali-
zation but in actually administering the therapy, a degree of activity sufficient to come 
within requirements for state action. The third group of patients are those who 
receive ECT in private hospitals or clinics, either on an in- or out-patient basis. It 
can be argued that a private hospital that receives state or federal funding to a 
significant degree or operates under governmental regulation may fall within the 
parameters of state action. See Note, Judicial Review of Private Hospital Activities, 
75 MICH. L. REV. 445 (1976); Note, State Action in the Health Field, 1915 Wis. L. 
REv. 1188. 
56. This section focuses on the validity of the consent of patients who are compe-
tent. Of course, many patients are legally incompetent and incapable of giving con-
sent. In these situations, representatives of the patient-relative, guardian, or a 
medical, state-sanctioned panel-must give consent. The implications of so-called 
substituted consent is discussed at note 208 infra. Substituted consent must also 
satisfy the constitutional standards for waiver when the treatment is administered by 
the state; of course, if the patient is competent, there is no reason to look to substi-
tuted consent. 
57. It is well settled that the competent individual has a right to refuse to submit 
to certain actions being performed upon his body. As stated by Justice Cardozo, 
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body .... " Schloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 
211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 
1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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interest that justifies treating a nonconsenting patient. It is argued 
that no sufficient state interest is adequately served by forcing ECT 
upon patients who are competent to make a rational choice about 
treatment. However, special problems exist concerning the knowl-
edge and voluntariness of these patients-that is, whether they 
have, in fact, given consent. The state should thus be obligated to 
provide some mechanism to verify that the purported consent satis-
fies the constitutional standards for waiver. This Note further main-
tains that the state, in many instances, will possess a sufficient inter-
est in treating incompetent patients who lack the capacity to consent 
to ECT. It is suggested, however, that a review mechanism is also 
necessary in these instances to ensure ,that the intrusion upon the 
patients and the risk of harm are justified by the treatment's benefits. 
A. Constitutional Implications of State Administration· of ECT to 
Nonconsenting Patients 
The right to refuse unwanted ECT is derived primarily from the 
constitutional rights of free speech and privacy. 58 
58. Additional support for the right to refuse treatment can be found in the first 
amendment's protection of religious exercise. In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), the Second Circuit held that, absent a 
judicial finding of incompetence, the forced treatment in a mental institution over the 
objections of the patient, a Christian Scientist, unconstitutionally interfered with her 
religious beliefs. The Court could find no compelling state interest to override 
Winter's first amendment right of freedom of religion. The applicability of this 
holding to the nonconsensual administration of ECT seems clear: A patient whose 
religious beliefs prevent medical intervention should be allowed to refuse medical or 
somatic psychiatric treatment. There are, however, both limitations and extensions 
of the right to refuse treatment when based on the right of freedom of religion. See 
text at notes 87-89 infra. It has been suggested that the right to refuse treatment 
based on religious protection should apply not only to those patients who belong to an 
organized religion but also to any person who has a sincere and deeply felt opposition 
to psychiatric drugs. See Bornstein, The Forcible Administration of Drugs to Prison-
ers and Mental Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379, 385 (1975). 
Another potential constitutional basis for regulation of ECT is·the eighth amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. If a treatment were given 
solely for punitive reasons, the requirements of the eighth amendment would most 
certainly apply. It is very probable that this amendment is relevant only in those 
cases where the treatment is used illegitimately. It is nonetheless noteworthy that the 
mere characterization of a procedure as treatment or rehabilitation has been held not 
to insulate it from eighth amendment scrutiny. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 
1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. 
Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). Courts have found eighth amendment violations in the 
use of vomit-inducing and tranquilizing drugs outside a psychotherapeutic setting. See 
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. 
Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 
U.S. 976 (1974). 
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff's claim that the ECT 
he had received was cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that "the deci-
sion to administer electroshock therapy was not triggered by any single incident nor 
did it involve an isolated treatment, both of which would be more characteristic of 
punishment," thus acknowledging in dicta circumstances under which an eighth 
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Freedom of expression as protected by the first amendment 
encompasses the right of an individual to communicate.60 Similarly, 
thought, or the action or process of thinking, has also been protected 
under that amendment. 60 Both communication and thought would 
not occur without a "logically prior antecedent," which is widely 
referred to as the process of mentation. 61 Mentation has been 
defined as "a person's power to generate thought, ideas, and mental 
activity."62 It describes the mental activity 1that precedes thought 
and refers to the mental process itself. 63 Extending the scope of 
amendment claim might succeed. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. -, -, 239 N.W.2d 
905, 909 (1976). 
There is little question that electroconvulsive therapy has been used inappropri-
ately. See Abse & Ewing, Transference and Countertransference in Somatic Thera-
pies, 123 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 32, 38 (1956) ("It is, of course, the frequent 
experience of a physician in a state hospital to be approached by a nurse who suggests 
a 'few shocks' for a patient because he has been fighting, resistive, uncooperative or 
even merely obscene in his talk."). The possibility of a perhaps unconsciously 
retributive aspect to ECT administration is suggested by one study which found that 
those patients chosen for ECT were highest on a doctor-patient tension level scale 
given to the administering psychiatrist. Rabiner, Reiser, Silverberg, Schacht & 
Gralnick, Method of Assaying Doctor-Patient Tensions: Its Application in Assessing 
the Role of Those Tensions in the Choice of Electroshock, 4 ARCHIVES GEN, PSYCH, 
553, 560 (1961). 
Finally, ECT may occasionally be used not solely as punishment but as punish-
ment for the purposes of treatment. See Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against 
Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 MISS. L.J. 605, 644 (1974). For 
example, ECT could be used in a program of aversive conditioning, a technique of 
behavior modification involving forms of punishment to discourage negative behavior. 
For an extensive bibliography on recent legal and medical studies on behavior 
modification, see 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101-11 (1975). 
There are reports suggesting that ECT has been used both for behavior modifica-
tion and for control purposes without supplementary psychiatric treatment. For 
example, unmodified ·ECT was given by an American psychiatrist to 120 patients in a 
Vietnamese mental hospital who refused to work. "Gradually there began to be 
evident improvement in the behavior of the patients . • . and [in] the number of 
patients volunteering for work. This latter was a result of ECT's alleviating 
schizophrenic or depressive thinking and effect with some. With others it was simply 
a result of their dislike or fear of ECT." Cotter, Operant Conditioning in a 
Vietnamese Mental Hospital, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 24-25 (1967). Because such use of 
ECT has an element of both punishment and treatment, it has been suggested that the 
treatment element controls making the eighth amendment inapplicable. See, e.g., Peek 
v. Accone, 288 F. Supp. 329, 337 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (dismissing petitioners' cruel and 
unusual punishment claim based on the forceful administration of thornzine because 
the officers "were not attempting to punish or harm the petitioner"). Others have 
urged that the courts should extend full constitutional rights when therapy is used as 
punishment. See Opton, supra, at 644. See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 
(9th Cir. 1973 ). 
59. See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the 
Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 256 n.51 (1974). 
60. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
61. Shapiro, supra note 59, at 258-59. 
62. Id. at 255-56. 
63. The distinction between control of thought and mentation is suggested by the 
California Court of Appeal in its description of the effect of the bill regulating ECT: 
"Here the state has sought to control neither what is thought by mental patients, nor 
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first amendment protection to include mentation simply recognizes 
that each step in the sequence of producing a communication is 
necessary and should therefore •be protected under the first 
amendment's right of expression. 
This was precisely the conclusion in Kaimowitz v. Department of 
Mental Health, 64 in which a Michigan circuit court prevented experi-
mental psychosurgery on a mental patient who was incapable of 
giving consent. The court reasoned that "if the First Amendment 
protects the freedom to express ideas, it necessarily follows that it 
must protect the freedom to generate ideas. Without the latter 
protection, the former is meaningless."65 The interference with the 
patient's mental process that accompanies ECT treatment is 
substantial. As with psychosurgery, the very purpose of the 
treatment is to change the nature of mental aotivity by organic 
means. Mental disorientation and loss of memory are frequent 
consequences. 66 Thus ECT-as well as similar treatments-should 
be considered violative of the first amendment's right of free 
expression when it is administered to a nonconsenting patient.67 
The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is also protected 
by the constitutional right of privacy. This right was deemed "funda-
mental" in Griswold v. Connecticut,68 in which the Court invalidated 
how they think. Rather, the state is attempting to regulate the use of procedures 
which touch upon thought processes in significant ways .... " Aden v. Younger, 57 
Cal. App. 3d 662, 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546 (1976). 
64. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Mich., filed July 10, 1973, 2 Prison L. Rptr. 433 
(1973 ). 
65. 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 478. That interference with mentation triggers constitu-
tional protections was also recognized in Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 
I 973). There, the Ninth Circuit found that the administration of a "fright drug" as 
part of a behavior modification program to which the patient had not consented could 
raise "serious constitutional questions respecting . . • impermissible tinkering with the 
mental processes." 477 F.2d at 878. 
66. See text at notes 42-52 infra. One characteristic of psychosurgery seen by the 
Kaimowitz court as impairment of the power to generate ideas was "the deadening of 
memory." 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 478. As the court in Aden v. Younger acknowledged 
regarding ECT, "[t)he extent of memory loss and the risk of permanent memory loss 
are not fully known or agreed upon, but the fact of memory loss is not questioned." 57 
Cal. App. 3d 662, 672, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541 (1976). 
67. One might argue that an incompetent patient-one who lacks the capacity to 
express his thoughts-cannot take advantage of constitutional protections, since his 
thoughts are not significant enough to warrant protection. This argument, however, 
suffers from several fundamental weaknesses. First, an incompetent patient may well 
have mentation or thoughts, though he is unable to express them. Second, the decision 
that one is incompetent itself deserves constitutional protection; otherwise, a fully 
competent patient may have his rights infringed when he is erroneously deemed 
incompetent and consequently treated against his will. To give this decision constitu-
tional significance is tantamount to saying that a mental patient has a right not to be 
presumed incompetent. Thus, it is appropriate to recognize that all mental patients--
even though some are wholly incompetent-enjoy the constitutional rights discussed 
in this section. 
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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a state statute proscribing the use of contraceptives by married 
persons. Since Griswold, recognition of the right of privacy has 
sustained the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons, 00 the 
possession of obscene materials in one's own home, 70 and the ob-
taining of an abortion within the first trimester of pregnancy.71 Al-
though it is difficult to discern a precise rationale that controls all 
of these cases, 72 it is nonetheless apparent that their underlying 
values would seem to compel a finding that the state's administration 
of ECT to nonconsenting patients violates the right of privacy. 
The fundamental value that the Court apparently considers to be 
supportive of the privacy right is the interest in individual autonomy, 
or the "right to be left alone."73 The "dignitary quality" of each 
individual requires that he have spheres of activity free from govern-
mental intrusion.74 Generally, the Court finds a right of privacy in 
areas traditionally considered "personal." For example, the fourth 
amendment has been held to protect those areas for which the 
person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."76 Justice Douglas 
has argued for "the autonomous control over the development and 
expression of one's intellect, interest, tastes and personality"76 and 
"the freedom to care for one's health and person."77 
It is difficult to imagine an aspect of the human condition more 
personal and more deserving of protection than an individual's 
mental processes. The court in Kaimowitz reached this conclusion: 
There is no privacy more deserving of constitutional protection 
than that of one's mind . . . . If one is not protected in his thoughts, 
behavior, personality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes 
meaningless. 1[I]n the hierarchy of values, it is more important to 
69. See Baird v. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
70. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
71. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
72. Professor Kurland notes that, because the constitutional concept of privacy is 
undefined, it is consequently confused with "a great many other notions that are 
related but should not be identified with it, because such identification both distorts 
and demeans it." Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections 011 Privacy and the 
Co11stitutio11, 10 U. Du. REC. 107, 117 (1976). The Supreme Court itself has noted 
that its privacy decisions, "while defying categorical description, deal generally with 
substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 
(1976) (no privacy right invaded by distribution to local merchants of a flyer 
containing a mugshot of the plaintiff under the heading "Active Shoplifters"). 
73. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
74. See Blaustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 971 (1964). See generally T. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 544-45 (1970). 
75 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
76. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
77. 410 U.S. at 213. 
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protect one's mental processes than to protect even the privacy of 
the marital bed. 78 
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court also stated that the adminis-
tration of ECT to a nonconsenting patient infringes that person's 
privacy: "At the core of the [U.S. Supreme Court's] privacy decisions 
in our judgment, is the concept of personal autonomy-the notion 
that the Constitution reserves to the individual, free of governmental 
intrusion, certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will 
conduct his or her life."79 The court characterized the impact of a 
decision to receive ECT as "unquestionably great, for the result is 
the alteration of the patient's personality."80 
The characteristic of ECT and other similar treatments that courts 
evaluate to determine whether the privacy right has been violated 
is "intrusiveness."81 In essence, intrusiveness measures the extent 
to which a treatment alters the behavior and thought processes of 
the patient. Because ECT can result in disorientation, memory loss 
or impairment of cognitive abilities, 82 it is not surprising that such 
treatment has been characterized by one court as "one of the most 
intrusive forms of treatment."83 Thus, the effectiveness of consent 
to a highly intrusive treatment such as ECT must be more critically 
scrutinized than consent to other kinds of medical interventions since 
78. 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 477-78. 
79. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn.-,-, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (1976). 
80. - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 911. 
81. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 543 
(1976); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 478; Price 
v. Sheppard, - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 910-11. It is useful to examine the 
meaning of "intrusive" or at least to ascertain what constitutes an intrusive treatment. 
Intrusiveness in the psychiatric sense involves a physical interference with the patient 
for the purpose of altering his thought or behavior processes. As the term has been 
used, both physical and psychological invasion appear to be necessary for a treatment 
to qualify as being intrusive. Shapiro offers six criteria which make up the concept 
of intrusiveness: 
(i) the extent to which the effects of the therapy upon mentation are reversible; 
(ii) the extent to which the resulting psychic state is "foreign," "abnormal," or 
"unnatural" for the person in question, rather than simply a restoration of his 
prior psychic state (this is closely related to the "magnitude" or "intensity" of 
the change) ; 
(iii) the rapidity with which the effects occur; . 
(iv) the scope of the change in the total "ecology" of the mind's functions; 
(v) the extent to which one can resist acting in ways impelled by the psychic 
effects of the therapy; and 
(vi) the duration of the change. 
Shapiro, supra note 59, at 262. The alteration of mental process or "intrusion into 
one's intellect" triggers the protection of privacy. But one's mental processes can be 
altered by countless nonintrusive stimuli every day. Hence the physical component is 
necessary to distinguish volitional and nonorganic changings of the mind from those 
that will occur organically as a result of treatment administered without regard to the 
patient's desire. Id. See also id. at 257 n.53. 
82. See notes 42-51 supra and accompanying text. 
83. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. -, -, 239 N.W.2d 905, 912 (1976). 
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the effect of the bodily invasion is to reorder, subdue, alter, or blunt 
the individual's mental process. The California Court of Appeal 
recently •recognized this facet of mind-altering treatment: "[W]e 
need not decide whether the decision to undergo medical treatment 
is deserving of constitutional protection in and of itself . . . because 
the right to privacy so clearly includes privacy of the mind."84 Al-
though the future course of the scope of the privacy right appears 
uncertain, 85 it appears •that the right is sufficiently broad to protect 
nonconsenting patients from state-administered ECT. 86 
84. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546 (1976). 
85. For example, the Supreme Court recently upheld a Virginia statute criminaliz-
ing homosexual relations between consenting adult males. Doe v. Commonwealth's 
Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The district court opinion characterized homosex-
uality as being "obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life." 403 F. Supp. 
1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
86. An alternative constitutional basis for finding a right to be free from 
unwanted medical treatment that is closely related to the privacy-right analysis is 
substantive due process. The close relationship between the two rationales is suggest-
ed in Justice Stewart's concurrence in Roe v. Wade: 
[I1he Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the 
Connecticut statute substantively invaded the "liberty" that is protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As so understood, Griswold 
stands as one in a long line of cases under the doctrine of substantive due proc-
ess, and I now accept it as such. 
410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), the Court 
again pointed out that, in the areas of marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education, "it has been held that there are 
limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct." See Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on "Roe v. Wade," 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); 
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Role in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the 
Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867 (1974). 
In the first third of this centuzy, under the doctrine of substantive due process, the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional state statutes that it characterized as "mere 
meddlesome interferences with the rights of individuals." Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 61 (1905). The legislation invalidated under thfs application of the 
fourteenth amendment protection of life, liberty and property was primarily in the 
areas of economic and labor regulation. The theozy of these decisions was that 
certain rights, specifically the freedom of contract and the right of private property, 
could not be intruded upon by legislative enactments passed under the state's police 
power. See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 
HARv. L. REv. 943 (1927). The Court seemed simply to substitute its own judgment 
about the wisdom of regulating certam subjects for that of the legislature. 
Although the use of the theory declined in the late 1930s, see Olsen v. Nebraska 
ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Assn., 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934), the doctrine has been revived in several recent decisions. It 
has, for example, been used by the Supreme Court to invalidate the confinement of a 
mentally retarded person because of his incompetency to stand trial, see Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-38 (1972), and the custodial confinement of persons not 
dangerous to themselves or others, see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 
(1975). Lower courts have relied on substantive due process theozy to protect 
institutionalized retarded persons from involuntazy sterilizations, see Wyatt v. Ader-
holt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974), and to establish a right to treatment for 
civilly committed patients, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 
19.71), supplemental decisions, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 
(M.D. Ala. 1972), affd. in part, remanded in part and revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v, 
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B. State Administration of ECT to Competent Patients 
1. The Strength of the State Interest in Forcibly Administering 
ECT to Nonconsenting Competent Patients 
Although state administration of ECT to a nonconsenting compe-
tent patient infringes that individual's constitutional rights, the state 
may proceed if it can demonstrate a sufficient interest in treating 
the patient. The interference by government with certain personal 
rights normally requires only a r~tional relationship between the 
state's purpose and the state's act. However, if the right infringed 
has been deemed "fundamental," the state's action will not be sus-
tained unless it can demonstrate a compelling or qualitatively greater 
interest. Under this approach, therefore, it is initially necessary to 
determine whether a patient's right to refuse electroconvulsive therapy 
is a "right" or a "fundamental right." 
There appear to be no objective standards by which to judge 
whether a particular right is fundamental. 87 Nevertheless, freedom 
of speech has been consistently declared fundamental. 88 Moreover, 
the privacy guarantee extends only to those personal rights that have 
already been deemed fundamental. 89 Since the right to refuse ECT 
is derived from these two rights, it is necessarily fundamental. 
A recent decision ·of the Minnesota supreme court effectively 
demonstrates this method of constitutional analysis. In Price v. 
Sheppard,00 the cour.t held that the state's administration of ECT 
to a fourteen-year-old patient without his consent and over the 
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974). 
Substantive due process analysis is appropriate if the state's administration of ECT 
intrudes upon a property or liberty interest of the patient. It is conceivable that an 
individual may be deemed to possess a property right in the integrity of his mind. It 
is more likely, however, that a patient might be found to possess a liberty interest in 
his mental process. The Court held in Grosjean v. American Press Co. that "[the] 
word 'liberty' contained in [the fourteenth] amendment embraces not only the right 
of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his faculties as well." 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). 
87. Justice Powell has stated that "the key to discovering whether education is 
'fundamental'_. . . lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). The usefulness of that standard was questioned by 
Justice Marshall who asked, "I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees 
the right to procreate, or the right to vote in state elections, or the right to an appeal 
from a criminal conviction. 411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). It would seem that the classification actually derives from a 
prior judicial balancing of the importance of the individual's interest against the 
countervailing assertions of state authority. 
88. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965). 
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See Gunther, Foreword: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine 011 a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 HARV. L. REV. l (1972). 
90. - Minn.-, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976). 
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objection of his mother violated the patient's right of privacy. The 
court said that, before forcing an unwilling patient to undergo ECT, 
the state must "demonstrate a legitimate and important state inter-
est."91 It further stated: 
[The right of privacy] is not an absolute one and must give way to 
certain interests of the state, the balance turning on the impact of 
the decision on the life of the individual. As the impact increases, 
so must the importance of the state's interest. Some decisions, we 
assume, will be of little consequence to the individual and a showing 
of legitimate state interest will justify its intrusion; other decisions, 
on the other hand, will be of such major consequence that only the 
most compelling state interest will justify the intrusion. 92 
The court did not reach the question whether the administration 
of ECT to the plaintiff satisfied a sufficient state interest. 93 It never-
theless expressed deep concern over the highly intrusive nature of this 
therapy. To prevent further intrusive treatments to nonconsenting 
patients, the court artic_ulated a procedure that would henceforth 
require judicial determination of the necessity and reasonableness of 
nonconsensual ECT treatments. 94 
It is submitted, however, that had the court in Sheppard reached 
the question of the strength of the state interest, it would have de-
cided that state administration of ECT to nonconsenting competent 
patients fulfills no legitimate or sufficiently strong state interest. 
The only Supreme Court case that considers whether medical 
91. - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 911. 
92. - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 910. 
93. Citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the court found for the 
defendant, arguing that "given the vagueness of the constitutional right of privacy, 
. . . the defendant could not reasonably have known that the administration of 
electroshock treatments to [the plaintiff! violated a 'clearly established' constitutional 
right." - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 912. 
94. The court adopted the following procedure: 
( 1) If the patient is incompetent to give consent or refuses consent or his guard-
ian other than persons responsible for his commitment also refuses his consent, 
before more intrusive forms of treatment may be utilized, the medical director 
of the state hospital must petition the probate division of the county court in 
the county in which the hospital is located for an order authorizing the pre-
scribed treatment; 
(2) the court shall appoint a guardian ad !item to represent the interests of the 
patient; 
(3) in an adversary proceeding, pursuant to the petition, the court shall deter-
mine the necessity and reasonableness of the prescribed treatment. 
- Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 913. 
In making that determination, the court should balance the patient's need for 
treatment against the intrusiveness of the prescribed treatment. Factors which should 
be considered are: 
(1) the extent and duration of changes in behavior patterns and mental activity 
effected by the treatment, (2) the risk of adverse side effects, (3) the experi-
mental nature of the treatment, ( 4) its acceptance by the medical community of 
this state, (5) the extent of intrusion into the patient's body and the pain con-
nected with the treatment, and (6) the patient's ability to competently determine 
for himself whether the treatment is desirable. 
- Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 913 (footnote omitted). 
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treatment may be given to unwilling competent patients is Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts. 95 In that case, the Court sustained a Massa-
chusetts statute that required citizens to receive smallpox vacci-
nations. It was held that "the rights of the individual in respect Qf 
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be sub-
jected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, 
as the safety of the general public may demand."96 In Jacobson, 
the public possessed a valid interest in reducing the risk of smallpox. 
No similar state interest is fulfilled by forcing ECT upon competent 
patients. The refusal to receive the treatment affects only the 
patient; there is no threat of a contagious disease that might 
endanger the public health. Thus, the conclusion reached in New 
York City Health and Hospital Corporation v. Stein is sound:97 
It does not matter whether this court would agree with her judgment 
[to refuse ECT]; it is enough that she is capable of making a deci-
ion, however unfortunate that decision may prove to be. It is her 
own well being that is at stake, and, giving effect to the spirit of 
[the statute], she must be permitted to consent or withhold her 
consent.98 
95. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
96. 197 U.S. at 29. 
97. 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 
98. 70 Misc. 2d at 947, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 465. See Cantor, A Patient's Decision To 
Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of 
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 2-63 ( 1973). 
The right to refuse medical treatment has been upheld in decisions that declined to 
order lifesaving blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses who refused them. In In 
re Estate of Brooks, the Illinois supreme court held that the free exercise of religion 
could be restricted by the state only "where such exercise endangers, clearly and 
presently, the public health, welfare or morals." 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435, 
441 (1965). The court refused to intervene even though it acknowledged that the 
patient's decision might be regarded as "unwise, foolish or ridiculous." 32 Ill. 2d at 
373, 205 N.E.2d at 442. Also, in In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1972), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to 
override the refusal of a transfusion by a religiously motivated patient. The Brooks 
and Osborne result was reached in Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 
705 (Sup. Ct. 1962), but on different grounds: the patient's refusal of a transfusion 
was respected on the grounds of individual autonomy and not religious belief. The 
court stated: "[l]t is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who bas 
the final say . . • . [T]his must necessarily be so in a system of government which 
gives the greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own 
desires." 44 Misc. 2d at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases in which the patient bas refused life-
saving treatment on religious grounds, the courts have overriden the patient's decision. 
See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
337 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 
1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. 
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582-83, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971); see Paris, Compulsory Med-
ical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Prevail?, IO U.S.F.L. REV. 
(1975). 
For the most part, those cases in which the patient's decision was overridden were 
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged in other contexts as well 
that the discretion to exercise certain personal rights must rest upon 
the individual alone. In Farretta v. California,°0 for example, the 
Court held that a criminal defendant could proceed in propria 
persona so long as his waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel 
was made knowingly and intelligently. Although the Court agreed 
emergency situations where the patient was not competent at the time the treatment 
was required to save his life. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of 
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1008. Arguably, these cases should be 
analogized to ECT and incompetents, see text at notes 131-43 infra, in which context 
it is argued that the state may have a sufficient interest in ordering the treatment. 
Usually, 'where the patient is fully competent and is making a voluntary and knowing 
decision, and no third party-such as a child-dependent-will unduly suffer, the 
patient's wishes are respected. These latter cases support the conclusion that compe-
tent patients should be allowed to refuse ECT. 
It should be noted, however, that the desire of a patient who, though incompetent 
at the time of transfusion, had previously indicated by means of a release card carried 
in the wallet, or the testimony of his family, that no blood was ever to be 
administered to him, has not always been treated as having expressed his will. See 
Paris, supra, at 3. This argument assumes that an individual who has given such a 
"prior refusal" would, if competent, revoke it when actually confronting imminent 
death. However, the commentators and courts that adopt this view have been subject 
to increasing attack. See, e.g., Cantor, supra, at 242-54. Cantor does acknowledge 
that the patient's refusal could be overridden if the result were to inflict "legally 
cognizable harm" on third persons but finds the traditionally protected harms to 
others (grief of family, economic loss to relatives, economic burden on state, stress to 
physicians) not sufficient. Id. at 249-54. 
Finally, even if one accepts the view that the state can require blood transfusions 
in any case, notwithstanding the patient's refusal, it does not necessarily follow that the 
state may override a patient's refusal in the ECT context. Unlike the need for blood, 
for which there is rarely a less drastic alternative, ECT is rarely required immedi-
ately. The American Psychological Association has stated that 
most psychiatric emergencies . • • can usually either be anticipated or initially 
handled without the use of somatic treatments such as electro-convulsive treat-
ment. For example, homicidal or suicidal patients may be well handled in pro-
tected settings for brief periods of time via, if necessary, physical isolation tech-
niques which deny the patient access to any potential weapons. 
Position Statement of the Am. Psychiatric Assoc. on Possible Revision of the Standard 
9, filed Dec. 20, 1974 in Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 
28, 1975). 
Thus, the blood transfusion case most analogous to the ECT problem is In re 
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), where the court respected the religious 
beliefs of the parents, and refused to order a transfusion for a minor child in a 
situation not involving an imminent threat to life. That analysis is the more 
appropriate one for the ECT context. One could, of course, argL'e that Green is 
incorrect. In that case, the surgery that the parents did not allow their child to 
receive would have probably allowed him to walk again; postponing the surgery would 
risk rendering him permanently bedridden. Arguably, the state has a sufficient 
interest in the well-being of its citizens to override such a parental choice. However, 
even if Green were so decided, the situation of ECT can be easily distinguished. 
Unlike the surgery contemplated in Green-and unlike the medical treatment contem-
plated in all of the transfusion cases-there is no assurance that ECT will benefit the 
patient and there is a substantial risk of complications. Because there is not nearly 
the expected benefit from such treatment, the state arguably lacks a substantial 
enough interest to compel ECT. 
99, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
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that a defendant would usually receive a better defense with the 
guidance of counsel, it nevertheless concluded: 
Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right 
to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the 
State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the 
defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether 
in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he 
may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his 
choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which 
is the lifeblood of the law."100 
2. Consent as Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
Medical treatment administered without the consent of the patient 
is likely to constitute a battery.101 With regard to state adminis-
tration of ECT, the consent must, in addition to making an otherwise 
impermissible touching privileged, amount to a waiver of the 
patient's constitutional rights. Without such a waiver, the treatment, 
in the absence of a sufficient st11te interest, is unconstitutional. 
The standard for waiver of constitutional rights has received the 
greatest attention in the context of the criminal law. In 1938, the 
Supreme Court, when sustaining the waiver of counsel in a federal 
trial, defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right."102 Since then, the Court has ,upheld the 
criminal defendant's waiver of rights in a variety of contexts.103 
Because of the importance of these rights, the Court has insisted that 
certain requirements be met to ensure the validity of the waiver. In 
Brady v. United States, the Court declared that "[w]aivers of con-
stitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, 
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant cir-
cumstances and likely consequences."104 
Thus, the three elements of a valid waiver appear to be compe-
tence, knowledge and voluntariness. It is apparent that informed 
100. 422 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
101. Consent is the mechanism by which the patient grants the physician permis-
sion to invade his person for the purpose of treatment. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, 
at 101. Thus, informed consent distinguishes legally permissible medical interven-
tions from those that would subject a doctor to liability on either a battery or negli-
gence theory. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 
1941); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 
(1969); Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 
1399-400 (1967); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1538 
n.4 (1970). 
102. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
103. See, e.g., Mich. v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (waiver of right against 
self-incrimination). 
104. 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted). 
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consent and waiver involve "essentially comparable standards";106 
accordingly, if a patient's consent to ECT is informed, it constitutes 
a valid waiver of the constitutional rights that nonconsensual 
treatment would violate.100 In most medical procedures, the process 
of giving or withholding consent is "private"-that is, the attending 
physician, based on his consultation with the patient, determines 
whether the patient consents to proposed treatment. The phy-
sician's judgment is questioned only if the patient or his represen-
tative later sues him, alleging that a necessary element of informed 
consent was absent.107 In the context of state administration of 
ECT, the unique situation of the institutionalized mental patient 
makes it extremely unlikely that truly informed consent will be 
given.108 Yet the manner in which the existence of informed con-
sent of institutionalized mental patients is currently ascertained poses 
the danger that consent will nevertheless be proclaimed by persons 
administering ECT. Consequently, further safeguards of patients' 
constitutional rights must be developed. 
Competence, the first of the three elements of informed consent, 
is "the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of 
the procedure, its risks, and other relevant information.»ioo The 
tendency of some individuals-particularly medical professionals-
to consider all mental patients legally incompetent reflects a gross 
misunderstanding; indeed, it is well settled that a person should not 
be deemed incompetent solely because he is hospitalized or is re-
ceiving psychiatric treatment. 110 This principle has been codified 
by several states,m and courts have specifically recognized that a 
person who has been civilly committed is not incapable of making 
decisions in all areas of his life. For example, one court held 
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that made the state com-
missioner of finance conservator of the funds of all residents of 
105. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 39, 
71 (1975). 
106. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 280-81. 
107. For example, a patient who is left unexpectedly paralyzed following surgery 
might sue his physician for nondisclosure of a risk of the procedure, alleging that had 
he been more fully informed he would not have consented. See Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
108. Difficulties presented by the physician's control over major aspects of a 
patient's consent may not be confined solely to the setting of psychiatric treatment. A 
strong argument has been made that, in most current medical transactions, physicians 
have become "increasingly susceptible to pressures which may conflict with the 
interests of [their] immediate patients" so that a profession-wide system of underdis-
closure has developed. Schneyer, supra note 7, at 127. 
109. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 476. 
110. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 
264 (1971). 
111. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5331 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 123, § 25 (1972). 
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mental institutions whose assets totalled less than $5000. The court 
considered this procedure violative of the patient's due process rights 
because no hearing had been held to determine whether the patient 
was capable of managing his own financial affairs. 112 
Thus, some patients will be sufficiently competent to form their 
own judgment about whether to consent to ECT. Many others, 
however, will indeed be incapable of giving informed consent. A 
number of psychiatric disorders prevent the patient either from 
understanding the nature of any treatment or, because of the 
patient's confusion or agitation, from articulating a choice about 
whether to receive it. In fact, one court has identified institution-
alization itself as a factor that impairs the patient's competence, on 
the theory that involuntary institutional confinement strips him of the 
sense of his own mental integrity and self worth.113 Surely such 
patients should not be deemed competent to give informed consent 
toECT. 
A difficult problem that threatens the efficacy of constitutional 
waiver requirements, however, is the inability of the treating phy-
sician to make an unbiased determination of the patient's compe-
tence. In most kinds of medical treatment, the physician himself 
decides whether the patient is competent and thereby capable of 
giving consent. When the physician who recommends ECT is an 
ardent believer in the utility of that type of therapy, he may be more 
inclined to find the patient competent because that result would 
allow him to pursue the course of treatment he deems best for the 
patient. 114 Since a competent patient can consent to and then 
undergo intrusive mental treatments, some sort of review mechanism 
is necessary to ensure that the patient whom the physician declares 
capable of giving consent is actually competent. 
The second element of informed consent is knowledge. For 
consent to be effective, it must be given knowingly; "uninformed 
consent" is tantamount to no consent at all.115 However, the extent 
to which a physician must disclose the nature and risks of a proposed 
treatment has been vigorously debated. Many jurisdictions have 
adopted the rule that a doctor has the duty to reveal such information 
as would be disclosed by a doctor in good standing within the medi-
112. McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1974), supplemental 
decision, 386 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1975). 
113. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 433. 
But see Murphy, Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic 
Therapies, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (197:) (institutionalization per se should not bar the 
inmate's ability to consent). 
114. Cf. J. NEAMAN, SUGGESTIONS OF THE DEVIL: ORIGINS OF MADNESS 171-72 
(1975). 
115. See Darrah v. Kite, 32 App. Div. 2d 208, 210-11, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291-92 
(Sup. Ct. 1969). 
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cal community.116 This standard has been severely questioned117 
and has been rejected in several states. Most of these states have 
embraced the standard that a doctor has a duty to disclose what the 
reasonable patient needs to know to make an intelligent decision 
about whether to undergo treatment. 118 As the California supreme 
court held in Cobbs v. Grant: 
[T]he patient's right of self-decision . . . can be effectively exercised 
only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelli-
gent choice. The scope of the physician's communication to the 
patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that need 
is whatever information is material to the decision. Thus the test for 
determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its material-
ity to the patient's decision.119 
This approach rejects the so-called therapeutic privilege that 
allows· the physician to withhold information if he believes its dis-
closure would be medically or psychologically harmful to the patient. 
The privilege is based on the assumption that revealing certain risks 
to the patient might unnecessarily frighten him and cause needed 
treatment to be refused.120 Persuasive evidence exists, however, 
that a majority of patients want to know what complications should 
be expected121 and that the risk of overdisclosure is exaggerated.122 
lHi. See Comment, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1397 n.5 (1967). 
117. See Waltz v. Scheuneman, supra note 101, at 639-40 (1969); Note, 79 YALE 
L.J. 1533, supra note 101, at 1559. 
118. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de11ied, 
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp. 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 
552 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688 
(1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 227 N.W.2d 
647, 653-54 (1975). See Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alas. 1975); Hamil-
ton v. Hardy, - Colo. App. -, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Demers v. Gerety, 85 
N.M. 641, 515 P.2d 645 (1973); Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. 
Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975); Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 
Ore. 129, 522 P.2d 208 (1974); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 
A.2d 703 (1975); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 523 P.2d 211 (1974). But see 
Miceikin v. Field, 37 III. App. 3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320 (1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 
Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976). 
119. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972). 
120. See Coleman, Terrified Consent, 2 PHYSICIAN'S WORLD 5 (1974). Problems 
with this therapeutic justification for withholding information are discussed in Cap-
ron, Informed DecisionaMaki11g ill Gefletic Cou11seli11g: A Dissent to the "Wrongful 
Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 589-91 (1973 ). 
121. Alfidi, Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J. AM. MED. A. 
1325, 1325-29 (1971). 
122. One psychiatrist states that the profession is unduly concerned with alarming 
patients by overdisclosure: "We regularly see our neurotic and even psychotic 
patients rise to the occasion when confronted with reality stress and exercise 
remarkably sound judgment. Neuroses are born of irrational anxieties, not reality 
based fears." Modlin, Informed Consent: Mandate or Myth, MEDICAL INSIGHT 
REPRINT (May 1972). In fact, one study reports that patients with clear ideas about 
the nature of the treatment show greater improvement than uninformed patients. See 
Park, Covi & Uhlenhuth, Effects of Informed Consent on Research Patients a11d 
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Both the nature of the information disclosed and the method of 
disclosure have traditionally been left to the discretion of the treating 
physician. Although strong pressures for underdisclosure exist in 
medical practices generally, 123 these pressures are particularly acute 
in the context of ECT and other mental treatments. These medical 
practitioners assume that their patients need mental treatments and 
are therefore particularly reluctant to disclose information that may 
cause the patient to refuse it. 124 Where the "community standard" 
rule for disclosure is in effect, underdisclosure to mental patients is, 
unfortunately, a protected practice. Even under the Cobbs rule, 
however, it appears that additional safeguards may be necessary to 
ensure adequate disclosure. 
Of the three elements of informed consent, voluntariness is 
perhaps the most problematic from the point of view of protecting 
patients' rights. Many commentators have observed that a certain 
amount of coercion is inherent in any doctor-patient relationship. 
The superior knowledge, expertise, and authority of the physician 
places him in an advantageous position in dealing with his patient. 
Moreover, the patient may be psychologically dependent on the 
physician and therefore unable to weigh the risks and benefits of 
a proposed treatment. m These factors tend to impede the volun-
tariness of the patient's consent. 
Study Results, 145 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 349, 349-57 (1967). Fuller 
disclosure may also inure to the patient's physical as well as psychological well-being. 
Schneyer points out that a patient often possesses information relevant to treatment 
decisions of the physician and that the patient may be unaware of the importance of 
such information for a treatment decision until the physician has disclosed certain 
data. See Schneyer, supra note 7, at 134. 
123. Tensions within the doctor-patient relationship may result in significant 
underdisclosure of medical risks and alternatives. See Schneyer, supra note 7, at 136-
41. In addition, increased third-party payment of medical bills has "blunted patients' 
pecuniary bias against costly treatment alternatives." Id. at 138-40. That such 
tensions may result in a decision-making bias toward underdisclosure has been 
explained in part by two aspects of the provision of medical services: 
First, the physician traditionally functions both as the manager of the patient's 
case who determines or at least recommends what mix of goods and services 
would best serve the patient's needs, and as a supplier who stands to benefit from 
the provision of only some of these inputs. Second, the inherently uncertain 
outcomes of alternative treatments may afford the physician a number of recom-
mendations that can be made in good faith. Therefore, biases, pecuniary or 
otherwise, could influence treatment recommendations. 
Id. at 136-37. Such biases may affect not only the amount o{ disclosure but also the 
method and timing of disclosure. See Capron, supra note 7, at 379. If disclosure 
occurs immediately before the treatment, it may suggest to the patient and to the 
hospital staff itself that obtaining consent is something of a formality-that there can 
be little expectation of refusal since so much preparation for the surgery has already 
occurred. California tries to reduce these effects by requiring 24 hours between the 
physician's disclosures and the signing of consent. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. § 
5326.3(d) (West Supp. 1976). 
124. See Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary 
Process, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 897, 910 (1975). 
125. See Capron, supra note 7, at 386. 
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No one seriously contends, of course, that the existence of these 
factors is sufficient by itself to render consent ineffective in the usual 
doctor-patient relationship. The difficulty in the context of ECT 
and similar intrusive treatments, however, is that these pressures 
are particularly acute. The nature of the coercion may be so intense 
that no involuntarily confined patient may truly be able to give 
informed consent. As observed by the court in Kaimowitz v. 
Department of Mental Health: 
The involuntarily detained mental patient is in an inherently coer-
cive atmosphere even though no direct pressures may be placed on 
him. He finds himself stripped of the customary amenities and de-
fenses. Free movement is restricted. He becomes a part of com-
munal living subject to the control of the institutional authorities. 
. . . Indirect and subtle psychological coercion has a profound effect 
upon the patient population. Involuntarily confined patients cannot 
reason as equals over whether they should undergo psychosurgery. 
They are not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of 
the inherent inequality in their position.126 
Further, it is by no means certain that voluntarily hospitalized 
patients are immune from the pressures placed on involuntary 
patients. Studies have shown that mental patients are sometimes 
classified as "voluntary" for merely failing to protest hospitali-
zation.127 Moreover, the classification may hide various forms of 
familial and official coercion.128 Once hospitalized, the patient is 
subjected to the same kinds of institutional pressures that face the 
involuntary patient.129 Even though a patient is considered to have 
been voluntarily committed, this does not assure that his consent to 
mental treatments is always voluntarily given.130 
C. State Administration of ECT to Incompetent Patients: 
The Strength of the State Interest 
Although it is true that many patients in mental institutions have 
126. 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 477. For a discussion of the inability of institutional-
ized patients to consent voluntarily, see Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners from 
Doctors, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 25, 27 (1975). 
127. See Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 
Nw. U.L. REv. 429 (1971). The "voluntary" label also covers all juvenile patients, 
regardless of whether they consented to treatment. See Ellis, Volunteering Children: 
Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840 
(1974). 
128. See Ellis, supra note 127; Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 127. 
129. A former patient writes that "the central fact of life for an institutionalized 
person is a persuasive and abiding sense of total powerlessness." Gotkin, New Words 
for an Old Power Trip: A Critique of Behavior Modification in l11Stitutional Settings, 
17 ARIZ. L. REV. 29, 30 & n.5 (1975). 
130. The court in Aden v. Younger found that the classification of mental 
patients, both voluntary and involuntary, was rationally related to the law's objective 
of insuring that certain medical procedures not be performed on unwilling patients. 
57 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542. 
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the capacity to make rational decisions for themselves concerning 
whether to undergo intrusive treatments, many other patients-
perhaps a majority-do not possess that capability. The predica-
ment of these patients poses problems distinct from those that occur 
when a competent patient is involved. 
As discussed earlier, in order to infringe a fundamental consti-
tutional right, the state must demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est. 131 An early Supreme Court case that directly addressed the 
question whether the state could unilaterally administer medical 
procedures to incompetent patients was Buck v. Bell.132 The Court 
found "[t]he principle that sustains compulsory vaccination [to 
be] broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes,"133 and 
therefore upheld a Virginia statute that provided for the sterilization 
of incompetents. Prtotecting the public welfare was considered to 
justify sterilization: Society would benefit financially because many 
sterilized incompetents could be released from the state hospital, 
thereby saving the state the cost of their care.134 Justice Holmes 
delivered the Court's opinion: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon 
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not 
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these 
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order 
to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.135 
Yet it is not self-evident that the state possesses what would now 
be considered a substantial interest in treating incompetent patients. 
The monetary considerations approved in Buck have been undercut 
by Shapiro v. Thompson: 136 In order to demonstrate a compelling 
interest, the state must "do more than show denying welfare benefits 
to new residents saves money. "137 Since the rights infringed by ECT 
are of a fundamental stature, the possible savings engendered by cur-
ing patients is not by itself sufficient to justify the intrusion. Similarly, 
131. See text at notes 87-100 supra. 
132. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
133. 274 U.S. at 207. 
134. 274 U.S. at 206. 
135. 274 U.S. at 207. 
136. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
137. 394 U.S. at 633. However, the North Carolina supreme court recently 
rejected an equal protection challenge to the state sterilization statute, finding that the 
classification of mentally ill or retarded was reasonably related to the object of 
preventing "the procreation of children by a mentally ill or retarded individual who 
because of physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency that is not likely to 
materially improve, would probably be unable to care for a child." In re Joseph Lee 
Moore, N.C. Sup. Ct. (January 29, 1976), quoted in 44 U.S.L.W. 2385, 2386 
(February 24, 1976). See also Note, Rights of Mentally Ill-Involuntary Sterliza-
tion-Analysis of Recent Statutes, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 131, 137-38 (1975). 
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the desire to rid society of incompetence has little strength. In 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court framed the issue as follows: 
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its 
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might 
as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all 
who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public in-
tolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation 
of a person's physical liberty.138 
If the state cannot incarcerate to limit the number of incompetents 
in society, it follows that the state may neither sterilize nor impose 
other treatments upon mental patients for the same purpose. 
Thus, the interests articulated in Buck that sustained a forcible 
medical intervention upon an incompetent patient are no longer 
thought to have substantial weight and would probably not sustain 
administration of ECT upon an incompetent individual. However, 
the sterilization procedure approved in Buck can be distinguished 
from ECT in an important regard. Sterilization is not a "curative" 
treatment, while ECT is intended to improve the mental well-being 
of the patient. That the state has a valid interest in providing care 
and assistance to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens 
under the parens patriae doctrine is well settled.130 This interest 
may well be strong enough to justify requiring ECT for certain 
patients. In fact, this was the holding of Price v. Sheppard: 
The state's interest in assuming the decision [whether a patient re-
ceives ECT] is in acting as parens patriae, fulfilling its duty to protect 
the well-being of its citizens who are incapable of so acting for them-
selves. Under the circumstances of this case, that interest can be 
articulated as the need for the state to assume the decision-making 
role regarding the psychiatric treatment for one who, presumptively, 
based on the fact of commitment on the ground of mental illness, is 
unable to rationally do so for himself. If that interest of the state 
is sufficiently important to deprive an individual of his physical lib-
erty, it would seem to follow that it would be sufficiently important 
for the state to assume the treatment decision. We hold that it is.140 
The rationale for this holding is relatively simple: The state acting 
as parens patriae may commit an individual who lacks the capacity 
to make a rational decision about whether to undergo hospitalization. 
Inherent in this determination is the judgment that such an individual 
can be forced to accept treatments. Otherwise, the individual 
could frustrate the state's purpose in hospitalizing him.141 
138. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
139. 422 U.S. at 574. 
140. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 911 (footnote omitted, emphasis original). 
141. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1344 (1974). 
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The difficulty with this position is that it presumes a mental 
patient, who has been incarcerated through the legal process, to be 
unable to make virtually any decision for himself. As a general rule, 
the state may not incarcerate an individual for custodial purposes 
only;142 hence, all involuntarily committed patients are presumed to 
need some form of treatment. It does not follow, however, that such 
patients are in need of highly intrusive treatments. In many cases, 
for example, counselling may be wholly sufficient. The fact of 
incarceration should not create a presumption that the patient loses 
all of his rights. A better approach, the nature of which is explained 
below, 143 would recognize that an adjudicatory hearing is required 
before ECT may be administered to an incompetent patient. Yet 
with the primary conclusion of the court in Sheppard there can be 
little dispute: The state has a valid interest in the health of its citi-
zens and may infringe certain rights of the individual in order to 
preserve or attain their well-being. 
Because incompetent patients lack the capacity to give informed 
consent, which is a prerequisite of medical treatment, many states 
have passed legislation specifying how substitute consent may be 
given. Sometimes "consent" is given by personal representatives 
of the patient, such as a relative or guardian, but more often it is 
provided by the state, through a doctor in a state institution or some 
other mental health authority who prescribes the treatment for the 
patient. Yet it should be clear that the state cannot waive or take 
away certain rights of its citizens without due process. Hence an 
adjudicatory hearing, after which a court may approve treatment, is 
the appropriate means of establishing substitute consent. The next 
portion of this Note will argue that this procedure, which is. not 
always followed, is actually required by the Constitution. 
D. Pretreatment Review of the Decision to Administer ECT 
In the case of incompetent patients, there is no effective check 
on the discretion of medical pi:actitioners, in the absence of legislation, 
to decide whether a particular treatment is the least drastic alterna-
tive or even whether it is necessary at all. It is also apparent that 
the present method of securing a competent patient's consent does 
142. The Court expressed its holding in O'Connor v. Donaldson as follows: "In 
short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual 
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing 
and responsible family members or friends." 422 U.S. at 575. Thus, the Court left 
open the possibility that a competent person might be confined for custodial purposes 
in certain circumstances, such as if he cannot survive by himself and has no one to 
lend him assistance. For example, the state may commit an aged individual with no 
means of support even though that person is legally competent. 
143. See notes 166-67 infra and accompanying text. 
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not adequately ensure that the consent is knowingly and voluntarily 
given. Medical practitioners, often unable to give an objective 
evaluation, usually have complete discretion to decide whether a 
patient is competent to refuse treatment; it is all too likely that 
competent patients will be treated as incompetents and will receive 
intrusive treatments without their consent. Although prohibiting 
ECT altogether has some proponents, such an approach ignores the 
needs of those patients for whom ECT is the last treatment alterna-
tive.144 Instead, giyen the significance of the constitutional rights 
involved, the magnitude of the dangers posed by ECT, the existence 
of several factors that impair the ability of a competent person to 
withhold consent, and the peculiar circumstances of incompetent 
patients, ECT should not be administered by the state without the 
approval of a review panel. In the absence of legislation, some 
courts have promulgated such a safeguard. 
l. Review of the Decisions of Competent Patients 
In the context of the treatment of competent patients, such an 
approach would have several advantages. It would help prevent 
patients whose "consent" has been coerced, either directly or indi-
rectly, from receiving treatment. It would relieve the administering 
physician of the power to make decisions in those cases where he 
has a conflicting interest that urges him to declare incompetency. 
By providing a check on unilateral treatment decisions by the phy-
sician, a review mechanism might, in a few cases, even diminish the 
impact of the numerous coercive forces affecting the patient that 
render informed consent an inadequate safeguard of the patient's 
rights.145 Still, •the mechanism's principal advantage is that it would 
prevent ECT in some situations where the coercive factors are so 
strong that consent cannot be freely given. 
Because all medical treatment is to some degree a physical and 
psychological intrusion upon an individual, and because there are 
potential problems with competency, knowledge, and voluntariness 
in any doctor-patient relationship, it could be argued that a review 
mechanism is necessary before any person can receive any medical 
144. It is accepted that for some patients ECT is the most effective form of 
treatment. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 21, at 636. 
It is, on the other hand, not sensible to abandon the informed consent requirement 
completely. Allowing the doctor to do whatever good medical practices dictate when 
the patient is incapable of consenting has been characterized as confusing "medical 
procedures for the benefit of the patient's health (which the medical profession is 
capable of assessing) with the patient's interest in the integrity of person or 
personality (which is a question of liberty and is not susceptible to medical judg• 
ment)." Jacob, The Right of a Mental Patient to His Psychosis, 39 Moo. L. REV. 
17, 36 (1976). 
145. See text at notes 125-26 supra. 
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treatment. Even if such an approach were thought desirable, only 
a few kinds of treatment-such as ECT or psychosurgery-are so 
intrusive that constitutional rights are invaded. 146 Moreover, mental 
patients deserve special protection not needed by other patients for 
several additional reasons. First, the problem of obtaining informed 
consent is greater with institutionalized patients than with noninsti-
tutionalized individuals. It is far more likely that patients incarcer-
ated for mental problems are legally incompetent. Patients are 
generally less familiar with the risks of ECT and other mental 
treatments than with the risks of treatments for nonmental illnesses 
and, as noted earlier, institutionalized persons are more susceptible 
to coercion. 147 Second, mental patients are more likely to receive 
medical treatment without their consent being solicited than are 
physically ill patients. This results in part from the ~istaken view 
that a patient who is unable to make a rational judgment about 
whether to be hospitalized, and who must therefore be involuntarily 
committed, is not capable of making treatment decisions for him-
self .148 Finally, the inadequacy of tort remedies makes a pre-
treatment review mechanism desirable. Although it is certainly not 
easy to compensate a patient for a physical injury such as an unau-
thorized tonsillectomy, it would be even more difficult to compensate 
a person for permanent memory loss or serious impairment of his 
mind. Where damage remedies are hopelessly inadequate, courts 
have fashioned other mechanisms-often procedural-to protect 
constitutional rights. 140 Yet injunctive remedies are not realistic 
safeguards. Mental patients almost invariably lack quick access to 
a lawyer when treatment is proposed. 150 Some patients may not 
even be competent. Others who desire the treatment will likely not 
sue even though their consent was directly or indirectly coerced. 
The suggestion that a protective mechanism is constitutionally 
required because certain factors prevent an individual from 
knowingly and voluntarily waiving his rights is not a novel legal 
146. The scope of such constitutional protection would probably depend on the 
scope, heretofore undefined, of the privacy right. It is conceivable that any touching 
could be protected by such a right, although such an interpretation seems unlikely. 
147. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text. 
148. The Minnesota Supreme Court has fallen into this trap: "The interest can 
be articulated as the need for the state to assume the decision-making role regarding 
the psychiatric treatment for one who, presumptively, based on the fact of commit-
ment on the ground of mental illness, is unable to rationally do so for himself." Price 
v. Sheppard, - Minn. -, -, 239 N.W.2d 9-05, 911 (1976) (footnote omitted, 
emphasis original). See R. RUBENSTEIN & H. LASSWELL, THE SHARING OF POWER IN 
A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL (1966). 
149. For example, the inadequacy of civil suits to protect against unreasonable 
searches led to the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 
(1961). 
150. See Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. 
REV. 936, 954 (1974). 
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argument. Particularly in the criminal law setting, courts have often 
ordered the creation of special safeguards when constitutional 
rights are endangered. In at least two situations-in-custody police 
interrogation and the assertion of a guilty plea-the Supreme Court 
has found mechanisms that ensure voluntary consent to be consti-
tutionally required. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 151 the Court concluded that the pressures 
surrounding in-custody interrogation can very easily overbear the 
will of the suspect.152 Finding such compulsion to be inconsistent 
with the suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation, urn the Court reasoned that adequate protective devices were 
necessary to dispel the compulsion, 154 and therefore held that all 
statements obtained during in-custody interrogation were inadmissi-
ble unless certain procedural safeguards were followed. m These 
constitutionally required safeguards included the Miranda warnings, 
which provided the suspect with both the knowledge of his rights 
and the opportunity to have counsel present. Through this pro-
cedure, the Court sought to assure the voluntariness of any waiver 
of fifth amendment rights.156 
A similar situation exists in the context of intrusive mental 
treatments. A review committee is necessary both to give the 
subject knowledge of the risks involved with ECT and of his right 
to refuse it, and to provide a third party who will help dispel the 
inherent coerciveness of the institutional environment. Using the 
Miranda rationale, no invasion of rights should be allowed and no 
consent recognized unless the procedural safeguard of submission to 
a review committee is followed. 
One difficulty with this analogy is that the suspect in Miranda was 
merely given the opportunity to consult with the third party. The 
Court did not find the in-custody atmosphere so coercive that the 
the suspect could not knowingly waive his rights. Thus, a literal 
application of Miranda to intrusive mental treatments would require 
only that the physician inform the patient of the risks of ECT, of 
his right to refuse consent, and of his right to speak with the review 
committee. However, such a procedure is not sufficient to protect 
the constitutional rights of a mental patient. A person who 
challenges the validity of his consent to in-custody interrogation is 
able to do so before he is sentenced to prison and hence before the 
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
152. 384 U.S. at 469. 
153. 384 U.S. at 457-58. 
154. 384 U.S. at 458. 
155. 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
156. For developments subsequent to Miranda, see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
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full weight of the constitutional deprivation is felt. In contrast, a 
patient cannot challenge the validity of his consent to ECT until 
after he has received the treatment and his constitutional right (not 
to have any mental alteration) has been irrevocably infringed. Thus, 
the decision to receive ECT arguably deserves even greater scrutiny 
than the decision to consent to in-custody interrogation.rn, More-
over, whether the person who is waiving his rights is actually compe-
tent to do so is more often a problem with mental patients than with 
criminal suspects. 
A second area where the Court has created safeguards against the 
uninformed waiver of rights involves the guilty plea. Since the 
assertion of a guilty plea waives the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's 
accusers, the plea must be made voluntarily and with full under-
standing of its significance.158 However, as the Supreme Court has 
noted, "ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, 
[or] subtle or blatant threats" may prevent the defendant's waiver 
from being effective. 150 Thus, the Court has required that judges 
make certain inquiries to determine whether the waiver has, in fact, 
been voluntarily made.100 Moreover, to provide further protection 
against involuntary waivers, the Court has decided that certain 
"prophylactic procedures"161 must be followed before a person's 
guilty plea is considered valid: The record must disclose the facts 
that caused the trial judge to conclude that the defendant entered 
his plea voluntarily and with understanding. 162 Thus, the Court has 
given an individual who may lack the ability to make a knowing and 
intelligent decision about whether to plead guilty the benefit of 
various mechanisms that help prevent the involuntary waiver of 
important constitutional rights.163 
157. Usually the patient who contests consent will do so in a tort·action following 
the administration of ECT. Thus, the analogy to Miranda would be complete only if 
a criminal defendant could not challenge a police claim of consent except in a tort 
action after he had been convicted, sentenced, and served his time. 
158. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
159. 395 U.S. at 242-43. 
160. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948). 
161. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
162. 395 U.S. at 244. 
163. :Similarly, the right to counsel at lineups can be seen as a constitutionally 
mandated mechanism to "preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected 
by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him." United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). See Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any 
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 
72 MICH. L. REV. 719, 755-59 (1974). In addition, in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 
483 (1969), the Supreme Court prohibited the states from barring inmates from 
providing assistance to one another in the preparation of post-conviction relief 
petitions unless the state provided a reasonable alternative to assist in the preparation. 
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While requmng certain procedures to safeguard constitutional 
rights, the Court has not insisted that any specific measures be used. 
For example, the Court in Miranda stated that the procedural 
safeguards elucidated therein were required unless other fully 
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right 
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it. 104 
Thus, it is not suggested here that any particular type of procedure 
for evaluating consent to ECT must be adopted; review mechanisms 
for other medical treatments vary widely in form. At the very least, 
however, some effective165 review mechanism appears to be consti-
tutionally required. 
2. Review of the Decision to Administer ECT to an 
Incompetent Patient 
In the context of the treatment of incompetent patients, a review 
mechanism possesses compelling advantages. It was previously 
noted that the holding in Price v. Sheppard-that an individual who 
is committed is not capable of making a decision about whether to 
undergo treatment-could cause patients who do possess such a 
capacity to undergo intrusive treatments against their will.166 A 
separate adjudicatory hearing on the question of treatment would 
prevent this result. 
For purposes of economy, this decision could be made during the 
commitment hearing, but the decision to impose intrusive treatments 
must be considered apart from the commitment decision itself. Such 
an approach would effectively protect the constitutional rights of the 
patient: The hearing that decides whether the state may commit 
considers the individual's liberty interests, and the hearing that 
decides whether to impose intrusive treatment considers the indi-
vidual's free expression and privacy rights. It might be argued that 
the tenuousness of the distinction between intrusive and nonintrusive 
treatment will hinder this approach by making it difficult to know 
whether the second hearing is required. This is not, however, a 
problem for the regulation of ECT. Its certain risks of harm and 
its profound impact on the mental process render it highly intrusive; 
thus, the state should be required to show a compelling interest 
before administering ECT to an incompetent. 
In addition to determining whether the patient is incapable of 
deciding whether to undergo such treatment, the second hearing 
164. 384 U.S. at 467. 
165. "Effective" review might preclude determinations by the treating physician 
himself or by a colleague. "Effective" might require that determinations and sup-
porting data be recorded. 
166. See note 148 supra. 
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ensures that the treatment is actually necessary and that all less 
intrusive alternatives have been considered. The court would not 
evaluate the therapeutic value of the treatment itself; rather, the 
court would balance the seriousness of the patient's condition against 
the treatment's intrusiveness, thereby ensuring that ECT is the 
least drastic alternative. 
Although the holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Price 
v. Sheppard is subject to criticism, the practical effect of the decision 
is wholly consistent with the analysis above. At the conclusion of 
the opinion, in response to its concern over the broad discretion of 
treating physicians in ordering therapy for nonconsenting patients, 
the court outlined a procedure that would, in fact, determine 
whether the patient was competent and whether the treatment was 
necessary. The court specified that, in the future, the medical 
director of the state hospital must petition the probate division of 
the county court for an order authorizing treatment. The court 
would then appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the patient, and, 
in an adversary proceeding, the court would determine the necessity 
and reasonableness of the prescribed treatment.167 Such an approach 
is desirable to determine whether the state has a sufficient interest 
to justify imposing ECT, a very drastic treatment, upon the patient. 
3. Summary 
Pretreatment review of the decision of the state to administer 
ECT to a patient would most likely be sought in the same manner 
in which most mental health rights have been secured. A patient-
plaintiff or his representative, perhaps representing a class, would 
sue a particular governmental entity, such as a state department of 
health, for violation of his constitutional rights. In addition to 
granting the plaintiff individual relief, the court could order the state, 
as it did in Sheppard, to obtain consent prior to the administration 
of ECT and to establish a review mechanism to ensure the validity 
of the consent of a competent patient or the necessity of giving the 
treatment to an incompetent patient. 
The effectiveness of this approach is, of course, not without limi-
tations. Mental patients are generally not litigious; their awareness 
of their legal rights is often minimal and their access to legal services 
is often negligible.168 Moreover, the class of mental patients pro-
tected when the court's order is based on constitutional grounds is 
restricted by the state action requirement; voluntary patients in 
private hospitals would be excluded.169 Finally, any judicially 
167. - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 913. 
168. See Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: 
Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 821-23 (1974). 
169. See note 55 supra. 
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ordered protections may well be minimal in scope. Such safeguards 
in the field of mental health are often difficult to implement and en-
force.170 Court supervision is time-consuming and burdensome, and 
the sanction of contempt may be inadequate to ensure compliance.171 
While litigation will probably result in the establishment of certain 
basic safeguards, a broader strategy may be needed for more 
comprehensive protection of patient rights. Legislative regulation 
of ECT is advantageous since statutory requirements and standards 
are not restricted by the state action limitation. Also, legislation can 
be more comprehensive in scope than case-by-case adjudication. It 
is to this type of regulation of ECT that this Note now turns. 
III. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF ECT 
It is well recognized that the power of a state to protect the health 
and safety of its citizens is vested in the legislature. 172 This "police 
power" has been described as extending "to the protection of the 
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons."173 In 
accordance with this power, states have licensed physicians, 174 have 
regulated the administration of drugs by medical practitioners,175 and 
have regulated conditions in which medical and psychiatric treat-
ments are provided.176 Legislatures in several states have also 
enacted statutes that monitor the administration of ECT.177 It is 
appropriate now to explore the constitutionality and desirability of 
these statutes. 
170. See The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Instilll• 
tional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). 
171. See Wyatt v. Hardin, No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 1975) (contempt 
proceedings unsuccessfully brought against three physicians and the hospital direc-
tor). 
172. For a discussion of the exercise of police power in areas where the state 
seeks to protect the citizen from himself, see Cantor, supra note 98, at 246-49 (1973), 
and Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Co11stitutio11a!ity of Self-Protective Legisla-
tion, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1969). 
173. Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1854). 
174. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE §§ 2100-2149 (West Supp. 1976). 
175. Blinder v. State Dept. of Justice, 25 Cal. App. 3d 174, 181-82, 101 Cal. Rptr. 
635, 640 (1972). In United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975), the Supreme 
Court held that a physician registered under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801-904 (1970), as amended by 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (Supp. V 1975), could be 
prosecuted under the Act if his activities fell outside the usual course of professional 
practice. The Court found that the doctor had acted as a large-scale pusher by 
dispensing methadone without adequate examination of the patient and by graduating 
his fees according to the number of pills prescribed rather than medical services 
provided. 
176. See, e.g., CAL. HEALm & SAFETY CODE §§ 1203-1554 (West Supp. 1976). 
177, See note 4 supra, 
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A. The Nature of Legislative Regulations 
Several states have enacted statutes that control the administration 
of intrusive mental treatments. Not surprisingly, the statutes are 
varied in format and purpose. Some have recognized an absolute 
right to refuse ECT; unless the informed consent of the patient, his 
guardian, or a next-of-kin is obtained, these statutes-though several 
suffer from drafting problems-appear to forbid intrusive treat-
ments.178 Others require the written consent of the patient or his 
guardian but also provide a procedure for the state to provide treat-
ment without such consent in certain circumstances.179 
The most comprehensive statute regulating administration of ECT 
and other intrusive mental treatments was recently adopted in Cali-
fornia. Assembly Bill 1032, which was signed into law on Sep-
tember 20, 1976, recognizes the mental patient's right to refuse 
convulsive treatment including ECT.180 Two principal provisions 
regulate the treatment. The first establishes several prerequisites 
to the administration of ECT to an involuntary patient: (a) the 
treating physician must document reasons for the treatment and 
certify that it is the least drastic alternative; (b) a review com-
mittee composed of two other physicians must agree with the opinion 
of the treating physician; (c) a full disclosure of the reasons for, and 
the nature and risks of, the treatment must be made to a relative 
or a guardian of the patient, unless the patient decides to dispense 
with this requirement; (d) the patient must give written informed 
consent, which must be reviewed every thirty days and can be revoked 
at any time; (e) the patient's attorney--or a court-appointed one-
must agree to the patient's capacity or incapacity to give written 
informed consent; (f) if the treating physician or the attorney 
believes the patient lacks the capacity to give consent, then an evi-
178. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(2)(d) (Supp. 1975) (written informed 
consent by the patient or his guardian is required for surgery, ECT, etc.). Accord, 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 26-17-18.5 (1969). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459(3)(b) 
(1975) (though unclear whether statute requiring written permission applies to 
surgery and ECT, or surgery requiring an anesthetic or ECf); IowA CoDE ANN. 
Senate File 499, § 23(2) (West's Leg. Serv. 1975 No. 2, at 182, 192) (right to refuse 
treatment by shock therapy or chemotherapy, although statute does not say that 
consent is necessary). 
179. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206(d) (1975) (No ECT may be 
administered without the written informed consent of patient. If he is incompetent, 
no ECT may be given without the informed consent of a guardian, a next-of-kin, or a 
physician appointed by the judge of the probate court.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
330.1716 (1975) (ECT may not be administered without (1) the consent of the pa,-
tient if competent, or (2) the consent of a guardian of the incompetent. If neither 
kind of consent is possible, then a probate court may consent to the procedure in lieu 
of the person eligible to give it.). Cf. KY. REV. STAT. 202A.180(7) (Supp. 1976) 
(empowering the Secretary of Human Resources to promulgate regulations to protect 
patient rights). 
180. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5325f (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE), 
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dentiary hearing is held in court to determine the patient's capacity; 
(g) if the court determines that the patient does not have capacity, 
then ECT may be administered after a relative, guardian, or conser-
vator gives informed consent; and (h) at any time, the patient can 
claim regained competency, thereby requiring (e), (f), and (g) to 
be repeated.181 
The second principal provision regulates all other administrations 
of ECT, including those to voluntary patients in a state institution 
or to anyone receiving treatment in a physician's office, clinic, or 
private home: (a) requirements (a), (c), and (d) for involuntary 
patients must be met; (b) instead of a review committee, one other 
physician must certify the patient's capacity to give informed 
consent; and ( c) if the other physician will not verify the patient's ca-
pacity, or if the patient lacks capacity, requirements (b) (e), (f), 
(g), and (h) for involuntary patients must be satisfied.182 
The statute also provides that any patient, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily committed, who is capable of giving informed consent 
and refuses to do so may not receive convulsive treatment.183 Indi-
viduals over sixteen years of age are subject to the general provisions 
of the act. 184 Treatment is prohibited on children under twelve years 
of age and is allowed in only limited circumstances on children be-
tween twelve and sixteen years of age. 
The California statute, in effect, accepts the constitutional analysis 
presented earlier.185 It recognizes that a patient may be incapable 
of making a rational decision about hospitalization yet fully capable 
of deciding whether to submit to intrusive treatments. A review 
mechanism is provided to ensure proper characterization of the 
patient's competence to make the treatment decision. The patient 
is given a representative to protect his rights in the adversary 
hearing. If the patient is deemed incapable of giving consent, 
safeguards are provided to ensure that the treatment is not given 
unnecessarily and that it is the least drastic alternative.186 The Cali-
181. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE), 
182. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.75 (1976) (WELF. & INST, CODE). 
183. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.85 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). 
184. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.8 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). 
185. Recognizing the danger of a violation of a mental patient's constitutional 
right to privacy, the Legislature intends by this enactment to assure that the in-
tegrity and free choice of every such patient is fully recognized and protected. 
Because those who are emotionally disturbed are vulnerable to being unduly in-
fluenced, the Legislature believes the protection of their rights requires a careful 
process of informing and consenting in order to assure the protection and vindi-
cation of their rights. 
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 1 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). 
186. It is not likely that a state could require all other forms of treatment to be 
exhausted before allowing administration of ECT. The potential benefit of an ECT 
treatment given immediately may outweigh the benefits of proceeding with a six-
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fornia statute could very well become the model for legislation in 
other states. 
B. Constitutional Limitations 
The traditional test for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute 
enacted pursuant to the police power has been to determine whether 
there is a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the legis-
lation and the means used to accomplish it. If, as noted above, a 
state interferes with a fundamental right of an individual, mere 
rationality is no longer sufficient;187 in such cases, the compelling 
state interest test is employed. Once it is shown that a state's inter-
ference with a fundamental right fulfills a sufficient state interest, 
however, the judicial inquiry is not concluded. At that point, the 
state must show that its enactments are "narrowly drawn."188 In 
other words, to ensure that the interference with a fundamental right 
is minimized, the state is required to choose the "least drastic means" 
to accomplish its purpose.189 
A variety of state statutes that single out certain medical areas for 
regulation have been found constitutional. For example, controlled 
drug classifications have been upheld as being designed to promote 
a permissible state purpose: "The legislative purpose [to prevent 
drug abuse] in making the differentiation [among various drugs] 
being thus permissible, indeed laudable, the courts will not assume 
the task, for which they are conspicuously unfitted, of inquiring 
whether every drug was properly placed by the Legislature in one 
schedule rather than another."190 The Supreme Court echoed this 
month drug treatment or a two-year consultation program, at the conclusion of which 
ECT may still be needed. A California court of appeal, however, upheld an 
exhaustion-of-all-other-appropriate modalities requirement fr<;>m an attack of vague-
ness by construing appropriate modalities to mean "any forms of treatment medically 
appropriate for a particular patient with a particular condition." Aden v. Younger, 
47 Cal. App. 3d 662, 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 544-45 (1976) (emphasis original). 
Thus the court concluded that "[e]very possible form of therapy need not actually be 
used on a patient, because not all forms will be considered appropriate for that 
patient. This is a purely medical determination, which is within a doctor's profes-
sional judgment." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545. Nevertheless, the 
new California bill requires only that "all reasonable treatment modalities have been 
carefully considered." Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(a) (1976). (WELF. & 
INST. CODE). 
187. See text at note 87 supra. 
188. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
189. This was recognized in Price v. Sheppard: "But once justified, the extent of 
the state's intrusion is not unlimited. It must also appear that the means utilized to 
serve the state's interest are necessary and reasonable, or, in other words, in light of 
alternative means, the least intrusive." - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 910 (footnote 
omitted). 
190. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1973), on remand, 403 F. 
Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), application for stay denied sub nom. Whalen v. New 
York, 423 U.S. 1313 (1975), probable jurisdiction noted, 96 S. Ct. 1100 (1976). 
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language in upholding a state requirement that informed consent be 
given prior to an abortion: 
We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior 
written consent for any surgery would be unconstitutional. As a con-
sequence, we see no constitutional defect in requiring it only for some 
types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac procedure, or where 
the surgical risk is elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for 
that matter, for abortions.191 
It is therefore not surprising that state regulation of ECT has 
recently been upheld. In Aden v. Younger, a new, important case 
in this area, a California court of appeal held that regulation of 
intrusive and possibly hazardous forms of medical treatment is a 
proper and legitimate exercise of the state's police power. 192 
Legislation regulating ECT is not likely to be challenged success-
fully on the ground that the treatment is not a proper subject of state 
regulation. However, many of the specific functions of the review 
mechanisms established by state statutes may encounter greater 
difficulty. These constitutional issues require more detailed con-
sideration. 
l. Certification of Consent of Competent Patients 
One of the most important functions of a pretreatment review 
mechanism is to determine whether a patient who consents to ECT 
is competent to make such a decision and whether his consent was 
knowingly and voluntarily given. However, the authority of the state 
to regulate ECT through procedures that review patient consent is 
not unlimited, for such regulation may actually interfere impermissibly 
with the patient's right to privacy. As discussed earlier, the right 
of privacy protects the individual by preventing compulsory adminis-
tration of ECT on nonconsenting patients. However, the right of 
privacy may also protect the right of the individual to receive treat-
ment without undue governmental interference. In this instance, the 
right of privacy may be asserted to preserve the sanctity of the doctor-
patient relationship. Indeed, as suggested by the recent Supreme 
Court abortion decisions, a statute that either prohibits a medical 
procedure or conditions its execution upon the consent of a review 
committee may impermissibly interfere with the right of privacy en-
compassed in the doctor-patient relationship. 
191. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 Sup. Ct. 2831, 2840 (1976) (footnote 
omitted). 
192. 51 Cal. App. 3d 662, 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 542. Yet a statute that regu-
lates "ECT," "shock treatment," or "intrusive treatments" might be challenged as being 
so vague that the statute cannot be constitutionally enforced. However, ECT and 
shock treatment have precise technical meanings and can easily be defined in precise 
statutory language. 51 Cal. App. 3d at 676, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 544. 
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The Supreme Court held in Roe v. W ade193 and Doe v. Bolton104 
that the right of privacy protected a woman's decision to consent to 
an abortion. In Roe, the Court held that a woman's decision 
whether to have an abortion was protected by the right of privacy 
and that no compelling state interest justified overriding her right 
during the first trimester. In Doe, the Court held a Georgia statute 
that prohibited a physician from performing an abortion without the 
concurrence of two other physicians and a hospital committee to be 
unconstitutional.195 
Although both cases recognized that a woman has a privacy inter-
est in the doctor-patient relationship, the Court declined to remove 
all aspects of that relationship from the scope of permissible legis-
lative regulation. The decisions prohibited state regulation of 
abortions during the first trimester because no compelling state 
interest was served by such regulation. Criminal abortion laws were 
originally intended in part to protect women from the hazards of 
artificial termination of pregnancies. The Court noted in Roe that 
"[m]odern medical techniques have altered this situation . . . . 
Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from 
an inherently hazardous procedure ... has largely disappeared."106 
After the first trimester, however, the Court found two compelling 
state interests that justified state regulation of abortions: "preserving 
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman"197 and "protecting 
the potentiality of human life."198 
If the Court's method of analysis in the abortion cases is applied 
to ECT, it appears that state regulation would be allowed. ECT can 
be easily distinguished from abortion in the first trimester, which the 
state is not allowed to control. First, such abortions are relatively 
safe; on the other hand, ECT, due to the possibility of rather severe 
complications, may threaten the health and safety of the patient and, 
accordingly, is an appropriate subject of state regulation. Second, 
while the abortion of a pregnancy is irreversible, it does not affect 
the woman's ability to become pregnant again. By contrast, ECT 
193. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
194. 410 U.S. 179 (1972). 
195. The Court stated: 
Review by a committee once removed from diagnosis is basically redundant. We 
are not cited to any other surgical procedure made subject to committee approval 
as a matter of state criminal law. The woman's right to receive medical care 
in accordance with her licensed physician's best judgment and the physician's 
right to administer it are substantially limited by this statutorily imposed over-
view. . . . We conclude that the imposition of the hospital abortion committee 
is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights and needs that, at this point, have 
already been medically delineated and substantiated by her personal physician. 
410 U.S. at 197-98. 
196. 410 U.S. at 149. 
197. 410 U.S. at 162. 
198. 410 U.S. at 162. 
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is known to have lasting effects on the mental processes of some 
patients. Consequently, the state has a greater interest in ensuring 
the patient's consent. Third, unlike ECT patients, women who 
obtain abortions are usually fully able to give informed consent. The 
competence, voluntariness, or knowledge 'of women seeking 
abortions are not likely to be contested.199 Finally, the function of 
the review committee that was struck down in Doe is distinguishable 
from the role of a pretreatment review mechanism that certifies 
consent. In Doe, the physician review committee was designed to 
override the decisions of women, who were almost invariably capa-
ble -of giving informed consent, to have abortions. A pretreatment 
review mechanism for ECT seems less intrusive since it simply 
certifies that individuals, whose ability to give informed consent may 
be impaired, have knowingly and voluntarily given consent. 
It is unreasonable to read the abortion decisions as creating an 
absolute privacy right in the doctor-patient relationship. As 
declared in Roe, "a state may properly assert important interests in 
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in pro-
tecting potential life . . . . The privacy right involved, therefore, 
cannot be said to be absolute."200 Thus, if the state can demonstrate 
that the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens is sufficiently 
threatened, as is most certainly the case with the administration of 
ECT, the state may establish a review mechanism to ensure that the 
patient has manifested an effective consent. 
2. Disclosure Requirements 
To guarantee that the consent of a patient is informed, state 
statutes and regulations sometimes specify what information must be 
included in the physician's disclosure to the patient.201 Although 
mandatory disclosure requirements have been challenged as imper-
missible intrusions into the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, 
courts have upheld them as a reasonable method of ensuring the 
adequacy of consent. 
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick, 202 a federal 
199. In fact, the Court in Roe presumed the knowledge component of informed 
consent when it enumerated broad areas as "factors the woman and her responsible 
physician necessarily will consider in consultation." 410 U.S. at 153. 
200. 410 U.S. at 153-54. 
201. For example, California requires that the proposed patient be clearly and 
explicitly told: (1) the reason for treatment; (2) the nature of the procedures to be 
used; (3) the probable degree of improvement; ( 4) the nature and probability of 
commonly known side effects; (5) the fact that professional opinion is divided over 
the treatment's efficacy; (6) the existence of reasonable alternative treatments; and 
(7) the fact that the patient has both the right to refuse and later to revoke consent. 
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.2(a)-(g) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CooE). 
202. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
/ 
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district court upheld a state requirement that a doctor make certain 
disclosures to a woman before performing an abortion. The state's 
regulation was deemed not to interfere improperly with the doctor-
patient relationship.203 The court found a sufficient state interest in 
the disclosure requirements in part because 
the [abortion] procedures, perhaps routine for those performing 
them, will probably be totally unlike any others •theretofore under-
gone by the patient. In addition . . . the woman may well be experi-
encing considerable emotional anxiety . . . . 
The state under such circumstances might understandably wish to 
be certain that each woman be given the facts regarding her con-
dition, her options, the abortion procedure to be performed, and the 
possible future consequences of the choice she makes. Like the 
licensing of facilities, the regulations, and the record-keeping provi-
sions, the informed consent requirement may well be an attempt by 
the state to monitor the quality of medical care received by women 
procuring abortions. 204 
The reasoning in Fitzpatrick is equally persuasive when applied 
to pre-ECT disclosure requirements. Mental patients for whom 
ECT is proposed are more likely to be unaware of the treatment's 
procedures or effects than are women who seek abortions. Thus, 
the California court of appeal has held that the California statute, 
which required certain information about ECT to be disclosed to the 
patient, constituted only a minimal invasion of privacy. The court 
said that the statute's purpose-ensuring that consent is given in a 
knowing and intelligent manner-"could not be accomplished by 
any means short of such disclosure, and the procedure is consti-
tutional. "205 
Some statutes, in addition to requiring that particular information 
be disclosed to the patient by the physician,206 also require that the 
same disclosure be made to certain relatives of the patient before 
ECT can be administered. 207 If the patient has been found to lack 
the capacity to give informed consent and the relative has been 
accorded the authority to give consent for the patient, disclosure to 
the relative is justified. Otherwise, the relative could not give 
203. 401 F. Supp. at 587 (Adams, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
204. 401 F. Supp. at 587 (Adams, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
205. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 548 (1976). 
In response to the challenge that some patients may prefer not to know and thus have 
the right to choose not to receive the required disclosure, the court stated that 
a patient's request to be left uninformed may provide a doctor a defense to a 
tort action, but it does not obligate or constitutionally coerce the doctor into ac-
ceding to the patient's wishes. The Legislature has determined ECT and psycho-
surgery are such intrusive and hazardous procedures that informed consent is a 
mandatory prerequisite to treatment. 
57 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (emphasis original). 
206. See text at note 201 supra. 
207. See, e.g., CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5326.3 (West Supp. 1976). 
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informed consent. Similarly, if the legislature allows a relative to 
challenge the decision of a court or medical panel to administer ECT 
to the patient, then disclosure would be appropriate, It would be 
incongruous to conclude that a state may authorize such an appeal 
but may not authorize the necessary disclosure to render it 
effective. 208 
However, if the patient is competent, it appears that his privacy 
would be unjustifiably infringed by mandatory disclosure to a rela-
tive. It might be argued that disclosure to the relatives of a compe-
tent patient fulfills a significant state interest: The state might assert 
an interest in encouraging informal counseling among family mem-
bers when intrusive treatments are being contemplated.200 Such a 
conclusion, however, does not necessitate requiring disclosure. If 
·the state desires to promote consultation among family members prior 
to ECT treatment, it should encourage rather than require the patient 
208. A more difficult question arises when the patient is incompetent and the 
relative, usually a parent, has been excluded from the substitute decision-making 
process. It is arguable that because the relative has no role in the treatment decision, 
any disclosure would be unjustified invasion of the patient's privacy. One court has 
accepted this view: 
The disclosure of the nature and seriousness of the patient's disorder is a clear 
infringement of the patient's right of privacy and no countervailing state interest 
is apparent. Because no standing to assert the patient's rights is granted to the 
relative, it is doubtful this disclosure furthers the protection of patients' rights 
or prevents unnecessary treatment. 
Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547. 
Although the court may be correct, it seems unwise that any statute should prevent 
substitute consent or involvement of relatives in the first instance. To exclude the 
parent or child of the incompetent, not only from participating in the patient's 
treatment decision but also from discussion of the question and even from all 
mformation about the treatment, may be insensitive to their interests and may not be 
legally compelled. Since family members may help care for the patient following 
hospitalization and treatment, they can more ably understand the patient's needs if 
they have knowledge about his treatment. Also families that are ignorant about the 
procedure might withdraw the patient from the institution if they fear the proposed 
treatment, Therefore, the state could justifiably authorize disclosure to certain 
relatives as part of advancing the patient's best interests. The revised California 
legislation follows this approach. A responsible relative of an involuntary patient's 
choosing is to be given an oral explanation by the attending physician unless the 
patient desires that the relative not be informed or unless the relative is unavailable, 
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(c) (1976) (WELP. & INST. CODE). This 
provision is particularly admirable because the relative to be informed is chosen by 
the patient himself; the intended benefit of the disclosure, consultation with the 
patient, is thereby made more likely. The provision also defers to patient privacy by 
allowing the patient to dispense with the requirement. 
209. The efficacy of consultation was recognized in Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 
(5th Cir. 1975), which was decided before Danforth. The Poe court examined a 
statute that required parental consent before a competent minor could obtain an 
abortion. It found that the purpose of parental approval was to help the minor make 
a reasonable decision. The court nevertheless held the statute unconstitutional: "At 
the very least, the statute Would more narrowly achieve the state's result if it called 
for parental 'consultation' rather than permission prior to abortion." 517 F.2d at 793. 
Because Danforth does not address the question of counseling, its impact on the 
validity of such a mechanism is uncertain. 
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to disclose the information himself.210 A patient who is sufficiently 
competent to decide whether to submit to ECT is capable of deciding 
whether consulting his relatives would be beneficial. Compulsory 
disclosure of personal information infringes the patient's privacy; it 
also threatens individual autonomy by subjecting the patient to family 
pressures he may wish to avoid. Compulsory disclosure does not 
serve a compelling state interest when the patient is competent; 
encouraging disclosure should be preferred, since no individual rights 
are infringed. 
3. Overriding the Decision of a Competent Patient 
Any statute that makes it too difficult for a competent patient to 
receive treatment may be overbroad. For example, assume an indi-
vidual seeks medical assistance for depression and the physician 
prescribes ECT. The physician indicates that the patient, after 
being fully informed of the nature and risks of the treatment, 
knowingly and voluntarily consented. It is proper for the state at 
that point to intervene and review the patient's consent. If the 
review committee finds either that the patient was competent but 
did not give consent, or that the patient was incompetent, treatment 
can and should be prevented. 211 However, if the committee finds 
that the patient was competent and did give consent, the question 
remains whether the treatment can be denied, or, in other words, 
whether the state can override the consent of a competent patient. 
Some states have statutes that require, in addition to the patient's 
consent, the approval of another person or a committee before any 
210. This is what the California statute does. See Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 
5326.7(c) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). Problems may arise when information is 
disclosed to public officials about the receipt and conditions of treatment. The state 
has a strong interest in assuring that its laws concerning ECT are not violated. To 
uncover violations, inspection of individual patient records may be necessary. In 
Aden v. Younger, the court held that the establishment of a reporting system seeking 
to control possible abuses of patients' rights would be a clear invasion of the patients' 
privacy if their identities were disclosed; thus, a patient's report could only be 
disclosed through a code that would refer to the patient's treatment records. 57 Cal. 
App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48. See Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), application for stay denied sub nom. Whalen v. New York, 423 U.S. 
1313 (1975), probable jurisdiction noted, 96 S. Ct. 1100 (1976). Comment, The 
Right to Privacy: New York Statute Interfering with Constitutionally Protected 
Doctor-Patient Relationship Invalidated-Roe v. Ingraham, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149 
(1975). 
211. As discussed above, see note 180 supra, and as recognized by the California 
court of appeal, "'[v]oluntary' patients .•. are susceptible to many of the pressures 
placed on involuntary patients." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43. If 
the pressures on all institutionalized patients are acknowledged as being equal, then it 
would seem that involuntary and voluntary patients possess undifferentiated interests 
in having their competently rendered decisions respected. The revised California 
legislation recognizes that the refusal of a competent patient, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, must be respected. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.85 (1976) 
(WELF. & INST. CODE). 
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treatment can be given. With respect to competent patients, these 
mandatory "second consent" provisions have been declared unconsti-
tutional for both abortion and ECT. In Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, the Supreme Court invalidated a Missouri statute that 
required the consent of a woman's husband, or, if she were 
unmarried and under 18, her parent, for an abortion within the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy. 212 The right of a competent patient to 
make his own decision about whether to undergo ECT was recently 
upheld in Aden v. Younger. 213 The California law in question did 
not permit ECT unless a three-physician committee unanimously 
agreed that ECT was "critically needed for the welfare of the 
patient."214 The court held: 
[O]nce the competency of a voluntary patient has been confirmed, 
and the truly voluntary nature of his consent is determined, the state 
has little excuse to invoke the substitute decision-making process. 
[T]here is no justification for infringing upon the patient's 
right to privacy in selecting and consenting to the treatment. 21u 
The court did not state that a committee could not prevent or even 
prescribe ECT for an incompetent, or that a committee could force 
a competent patient to receive it. It simply held that the committee 
could not prevent a competent patient who desires ECT from re-
ceiving such treatment when at least one physician is willing to ad-
minister it. 
The state may nevertheless be able to justify "second consent" 
provisions on another rationale. Because a large proportion of 
health services are provided by state funds, the state has a valid interest 
in ensuring that health resources are not wasted. More importantly, 
the state has a valid interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens; to the extent that citizens undergo inherently risky medical 
treatments that are unnecessary, this interest is impaired.210 The 
issue, then, is whether the interest is sufficiently compelling to over-
ride a competent patient's decision to receive ECT. 
212. 96 Sup. Ct. 2831 (1976). Developing its holding in Roe v. Wade, the Court 
concluded: "[W]e cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority to give 
the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her preg-
nancy, when the State itself lacks that right." 96 Sup. Ct. at 2841 (citation omitted). 
And in striking down required parental approval the Court explained: 
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when 
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are pro-
tected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights . . . . 
Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the 
minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the 
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant. 
96 Sup. Ct. at 2843-44 (citations omitted). 
213. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976). 
214. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 544. 
215. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 684, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 549. 
216. See S.R. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1972). 
December 1976] Electroconvulsive Therapy 407 
This question was posed in a different context in Planned Parent-
hood Association v. Fitzpatrick,217 which involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that required a determi-
nation of pregnancy prior to the performance of an abortion. 218 The 
requirement precluded the use of one technique of abortion, 
menstrual extraction, which is most effective when performed prior to 
the time that many widely used tests can detect a pregnancy. 
Even though menstrual extraction is performed during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy, which Roe v. Wade immunized from state 
regulation, the constitutionality of the provision was upheld: 
"[W]e do not believe that Roe precludes the state from requiring 
a positive determination of pregnancy prior to the performance of 
an abortion procedure in furtherance of its interest in protecting 
nonpregnant females from undergoing unneeded abortion pro-
cedures."219 If this reasoning were applied to ECT, "second con-
sent" statutes would seemingly be constitutional, so long as over-
riding the patient's consent was intended to help the patient. Given 
the high risks of ECT, the state may well be able to assert this 
interest and prevail. 
Although a state may prohibit unnecessary administrations of 
ECT, the standard that draws the demarcation between necessary 
and unnecessary treatment must be carefully articulated. For 
example, the former California standard-that ECT be "critically 
needed for the welfare of the patient"-was declared void for vague-
ness. 220 The recently adopted California statute attempts to im-
prove this language. Under the new act, treatment may not be given 
unless it "is definitely indicated and is the least drastic alternative for 
this patient at this time."221 If even greater specificity is desired, a 
217. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
218. In Fitzpatrick, patients in Philadelphia County could obtain an effective test 
to determine pregnancy at an early stage, but this procedure was not available outside 
the county. 401 F. Supp. at 573-74. 
219. 401 F. Supp. at 574. A related case is Association of American Physician 
& Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd. without opinion, 423 
U.S. 975 ( 1975), where the court rejected a challenge to the professional standards 
review organizations. These committees were established by Congress to ensure that 
payment for medical services under Medicare and Medicaid would be made only when 
those services were medically necessary and could not be provided as effectively on a 
less expensive out-patient basis. The court upheld the power of the committees 
because of the legitimate interest of government in controlling the rapidly rising costs 
of its health care delivery systems. The organizations, however, did not actually 
function as a "second consent" mechanism. A patient could still get treatment; the 
government would simply not pay for it. 
220. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 545 (1976). 
221. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(a) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). 
Because special knowledge is required to evaluate a medical recommendation, the 
committee checking the quality of informed consent may not be able to make this 
second determination unless it is compoSed of physicians. Another possibility is 
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statute could list those illnesses-such as acute schizophrenia and 
indogenous depression-for which ECT is appropriate. 222 
C. Incompetent Patients and Substitute Consent 
As discussed earlier, if any one of the three elements of informed 
consent-competence, knowledge or voluntariness-is absent, the 
consent is not effective. Yet incompetent patients, who may well 
need treatment most, cannot give informed consent and the concomi-
tant waiver of constitutional rights. Most states, therefore, have 
adopted legislation that establishes procedures for "substitute con-
sent."223 Usually, a relative, guardian, conservator, committee of 
physicians, or court is empowered to perform this function. 224 The 
suggested by the new standard 9 in Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. 
Ala., Feb. 28, 1975). There, no ECT can be given unless the recommendation for 
treatment has been made by a qualified mental health professional, concurred in by a 
second qualified mental health professional, and approved by the hospital director. 
Whether the determination is to be made by a physician as part of the informed 
consent determination of the committee or prior to the patient's consent is surely 
within the legislative prerogative. The only requirements should be that those persons 
approving the medical appropriateness of the recommendation are qualified to evaluate 
the information and that their approval is not a pro forma exercise. To prevent 
concurrence in the treating physician's recommendation from being automatically 
approved by a colleague, the legislature could require the recommendation, the 
reasons given for it, and the approval to be in writing to minimize the potential for 
such a concurrence. Other possibilities might include requiring the concurrence of 
two doctors or the impartial appointment and rotation of a physician or physicians 
to serve in this capacity. 
222. But the federal district court in Wyatt has stated: 
It must be emphasized at the outset of this order that, in setting forth the mini-
mum constitutional requirements for the employment of certain extraordinary or 
potentially hazardous modes of treatment, the court is not undertaking to deter-
mine which forms of treatment are appropriate in particular situations. Such 
a diagnostic decision is a medical judgment and is not within the province, juris-
diction or expertise of this Court. • . . But the determination of what proce-
dural safeguards must accompany the use of extraordinary or potentially hazard-
ous modes of treatment on patients in the state's mental institutions is a funda-
mentally legal question . . . . 
Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 1975). 
223. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(g) (1976) (WELP. & INST. 
CODE). California provides no guidelines to help the surrogate make his decision to 
consent for the incompetent patient. 
The Wyatt v. Hardin standard, on the other hand, provides that the determination 
made by the substitute decision-maker, here the Extraordinary Treatment Committee, 
should be based upon a review of pertinent medical, psychiatric, psychological and 
social information concerning the patient; an interview with the patient, his family or 
others who could contribute relevant information; and the recommendation of a 
mental health professional recommending treatment. The standard also provides that 
"great weight" shall be given to any expression of the patient of a desire not to be 
subjected to ECT. Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 
1975). The inclusion of some legislative, or, as in Wyatt, a judicial, expression of 
what criteria should make up a best-interests determination is preferred. 
224. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly Bill § 5326.7(g) (1976) (WELP. & INST, Coon); 
(involuntary incompetent); Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., 
Feb. 28, 1975). Cf. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substi-
tuted Judgment Doctrine, 16 CoLUM. L. REv. 48, 67-68 (1976). 
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consent of the representative must be informed; indeed, to be a valid 
waiver of constitutional rights, the consent must be knowingly and 
voluntarily given. 
If some method of substitute consent is not made available the 
alternative is to ban ECT altogether for incompetents. Such a 
position is not implausible. It might be argued that a state cannot 
constitutionally authorize a third party to consent to ECT for an 
incompetent because the potential consequences of ECT are so 
severe and its intrusion on the mental process is so great that only 
the patient himself should be able to give consent. Although a pro-
ponent of this view must concede that a state acting as parens patriae 
may authorize certain treatments for incompetent patients, such as 
nonpsychiatric or nonintrusive interventions, he would argue that the 
purpose of, and risks inherent in, ECT are qualitatively different. 
Thus, the state should not be able to provide substitute consent: If 
the state lacks a sufficient interest to force competent persons to 
receive ECT, 225 it likewise does not have a sufficient interest to 
"impose" ECT upon nonconsenting incompetents. 
On at least two occasions, courts have agreed with this position 
and have prevented the administration of intrusive treatments to 
incompetents. The first decision that embraced this view was Wyatt 
v. Stickney.226 Although the court would eventually change its 
position, it initially decided that the requirement of informed con-
sent forbade treatment of incompetents: 227 
Patients have a right not to be subjected to treatment procedures such 
as lobotomy, electroconvulsive treatment, adversive reinforcement 
conditioning or other unusual or hazardous treatment procedures 
without their express and informed consent after consultation with 
counsel or interested party of the patient's choice.2211 
This position was also adopted in Kaimowitz v. Department of 
Mental Health. After deciding that institutionalization diminished 
the patient's capacity to consent to irreversible experimental psycho-
surgery, the court rejected the possibility of substitute consent: 
"Although guardian or parental consent may be legally adequate 
225. See text at notes 87-97 supra. 
226. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd. in part, remanded in part and 
revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
227. "After a thorough consideration of [the] written requests and responses [of 
the parties and amici curiae] and the Court's further study of Bryce and Searcy 
hospitals' experiences in operating under Standard 9, the Court's of the opinion that a 
substantial revision of the present Standard 9 is in order." Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. 
Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 1975). The revised standard 9 provided 
that patients incompetent to consent could receive ECT after several procedural 
requirements, including the determination by the Extraordinary Treatment Committee 
that treatment is in the patient's best interest. 
228. 344 F. Supp. at 380. 
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when arising out of traditional circumstances, it is legally ineffective 
in the psychosurgery situation."229 
However, total prohibition of ECT for incompetents is undesirable. 
Although a state does not have a sufficiently compelling interest to 
force ECT upon a competent patient, it does not follow that the state 
lacks a sufficient interest to provide a mechanism whereby an 
incompetent can obtain treatment. Technically, the incompetent 
person cannot refuse treatment because he is incapable of making 
a decision. When a representative of the patient makes the decision 
to proceed with treatment, the patient's wishes are not overruled. 
The representative, in effect, is attempting to approximate the 
choice the patient would make if he were competent. Under this 
view, substitute consent is not compulsion but rather a mechanism 
that makes treatment available and thus is an appropriate device 
for the state to utilize. 
Moreover, ECT is not a treatment that courts should classify as 
being so hazardous that it cannot be administered to incompetents 
under any circumstance. There are patients for whom no less 
drastic treatment could be effective and for whom ECT offers a chance 
of better health. 230 Three years after the court in Wyatt v. Stickney 
declared that incompetents could not receive ECT, it took notice of 
these arguments and established a substitute consent mechanism for 
incompetent patients. 231 Its rationale should sustain statutory sub-
stitute consent. 
Once it is determined that the state may provide for substitute 
consent for treatment, the difficult problem of what kind of mecha-
nism best represents the patient's interests remains. A relative of 
229. 2 Prison L. Rptr. 433, 476 (1976). It may be significant that both cases 
involved psychosurgery and not ECT. Psychosurgery may be deemed more intrusive 
than ECT, and substituted consent may be allowed for ECT but not surgery. For 
example, California's new legislation requires consent from the patient himself for 
psychosurgery and provides no mechanism for substituted consent so that an incompe-
tent patient can receive it. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.6 (1976) (WELF, & 
INST. CoDE). However, a substituted consent mechanism is provided for ECT. 
230. This position is reflected in the California requirement that ECT be used 
only after all other treatment modalities had been considered. See Cal. Assembly Bill 
No. 1032, §§ 5326.7(a) & 5326.75(a) (1976) (V'elf. & Inst. Code). 
231. See note 227 supra. The Wyatt v. Hardin procedure is similar to that 
promulgated in Price v. Sheppard. Attempting to respect the integrity of the patient 
without denying him potentially beneficial treatment, the Wyatt court established the 
Extraordinary Treatment Committee and empowered it to make best interest de-
terminations for incompetents. It also imposed three conditions on the committee's 
ability to order treatment. First, the patient must be represented by counsel at all 
proceedings and deliberations. Second, all doubts about the wisdom of ECT must be 
resolved against authorizing the treatment. Finally, if the committee does conclude 
that ECT should be administered, the patient or a relative can appeal the decision. A 
legislature might also require that there be additional verification that ECT is 
medically indicated and that the person(s) exercising the consent are subject to the 
consent requirements imposed on competent persons. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly Bill 
No. 1032, § 5326.7(g) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CoDE). 
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the patient has traditionally been recognized as an appropriate 
surrogate. 232 However, several commentators have recently ob-
served that a relative-particularly a close one-may not be the 
person best qualified to make a judgment for the patient:233 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court, cognizant of this problem, has concluded 
that those individuals responsible for the patient's commitment-fre-
quently relatives-cannot represent the patient's interests in the 
adjudicatory hearing where the decision whether to administer ECT 
is made. 234 If a relative is allowed to substitute his consent for that 
of the patient, the relative's decision should be subjected to the same 
scrutiny as the consent of a competent patient. Whatever dis-
closures would have been made to a competent patient should also 
be made to the relative. Just as an inquiry is made into whether 
a physician is coercing a patient's consent, the same inquiry should 
be made into whether the physician is pressuring the relative to give 
consent by, for example, conditioning or threatening to condition the 
patient's release upon their consent. , If no relative is available, some 
statutes allow a court to designate a representative who may be able 
either to give consent himself or to ask the court for an order au-
thorizing treatment. 235 Some statutes allow such a representative 
even though a relative is available. 236 This procedure may be 
unwise; a relative should at least be allowed to challenge the decision 
of the court-appointed representative in an adjudicatory hearing. 
D. Summary 
When the decision-making process for the administration of ECT 
has been challenged in court, courts have typically devised methods 
to protect the rights of mental patients. They have frequently con-
cluded that a pretreatment review mechanism is the best means of 
helping to ensure both the validity of a competent patient's consent 
and the desirability of treating an incompetent patient. Not 
232. W. PROSSER, supra note 54 at 102-03. 
233. In particular, conflicts of interest have been recognized in parental decision-
making for children. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors 
to Mental lnstitutio11s, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 850-51, 857-59 (1974). 
234. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 913 n.11. California 
avoids a conflict of interest by providing that no one serving on a review committee 
can be otherwise personally involved in the treatment of the patient whose case he is 
reviewing. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.55 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). 
Similarly, a recent Tennessee statute provides for a lawyer to represent minors who 
need ECT but prohibits the appointment of any lawyer who has advised the party 
seeking authorization of ECT for the minor, who has advised the minor's parents, or 
who is connected with a parent's business. Tennessee Public Act of 1976, ch. 489, 
§ l(c). 
235. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 17-206<1 (West Supp. 1977). 
236. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. SrAT. ANN.§ 17-206d. (West Supp. 1977). 
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surprisingly, a number of states have adopted legislation that re-
quires for all cases of ECT administration many of the same pro-
cedures already developed by the courts. These statutes raise many 
questions, the most crucial of which have been analyzed above. 
Undoubtedly, other questions will eventually be raised as legislatures 
seek to devise new ways to protect the rights of mental patients. 
Nevertheless, much of the analysis of the issues presented by current 
statutes may well be useful in resolving these developing, but related, 
questions. 
